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Abstract. There are several typing results that, for certain classes of
protocols, show it is without loss of attacks to restrict the intruder to
sending only well-typed messages. So far, all these typing results hold
only for relatively simple protocols that do not keep a state beyond
single sessions, excluding stateful protocols that, e.g., maintain long-term
databases. Recently, several verification tools for stateful protocols have
been proposed, e.g., Set-pi, AIF-ω, and SAPIC/Tamarin, but for none of
these a typing result has been established. The main contribution of this
paper is a typing result, for a large class of stateful protocols, based on a
symbolic protocol model. We illustrate how to connect several formalisms
for stateful protocols to this symbolic model. Finally, we discuss how the
conditions of our typing result apply to existing protocols, or can be
achieved by minor modifications.
1 Introduction
Many automated protocol verification methods [7,8,11,29,30] rely on a typed
model in which the attacker can only send well-typed messages. Such a restriction
to a typed model can also significantly reduce verification time and in some
approaches [9,5] protocol verification even becomes decidable in a typed model.
There are in fact several results [1,19,18,13,26,2] that show the relative soundness
of a typed model if the protocol satisfies reasonable and sufficient conditions of
a syntactic nature (i.e., can be checked without an exploration of the state space
of the protocol). These typing results are of the form: if a protocol that satisfies
the sufficient conditions has an attack then it has a well-typed attack, in which
the attacker only sends well-typed messages. In other words, if the protocol is
secure in a typed model then it is secure in an untyped model.
In a nutshell, when proving a typing result, one shows (for a given class of
protocols) that from an ill-typed attack we can construct a similar well-typed
attack, i.e., every ill-typed message that the intruder sends can be replaced
with a well-typed one so that all the remaining steps of the attack can still
be performed in a similar way. To avoid messy and round-about arguments,
all existing typing results argue via a constraint-based representation of the
intruder. In these constraints, all messages sent and received by the intruder
may contain variables where the corresponding honest agent would accept any
value. Every attack is then a solution of such a constraint. There is a sound,
complete, and terminating reduction procedure for such intruder constraints. It
thus suffices to show that for the considered class of protocols, this reduction
procedure will never instantiate any variable with a term of a different type
than the variable has. If the procedure leaves any variables uninstantiated (i.e.,
its concrete value does not matter for the attack to work) then the intruder may
as well choose a well-typed value here. This therefore allows to conclude that if
there is a solution (i.e., attack), then there is a well-typed one. This can also be
extended with equality and inequality constraints on messages, see e.g. [1].
All mentioned typing results, however, only apply to simple protocols in
which agents do not maintain a global state, but have state only local to a single
session, like a session key.1 A more interesting and general class of protocols is
one in which agents can additionally manipulate a global mutable state, e.g.,
maintain sets of public keys. In such protocols updating the global state dur-
ing one session might influence other running sessions. We call such protocols
stateful. Currently there exist several tools and approaches for verifying stateful
protocols [17,25,27,3,22,4,23]. If we consider as a global state a database to which
entries can be added (without bound) and deleted, and where negative checks
are allowed (i.e., that no entry of a particular form is present), then this is not
possible with a straightforward extension of existing typing results. While one
could encode the positive operations and checks as special messages, the negative
ones essentially amount to checking that a particular operation or message did
not occur, and this negation is at odds with the intruder constraints needed to
perform the main proof argument of the typing result.
The main contribution of this paper is a typing result for a large class of
protocols with a global state that consists of a countable collection of sets, even
when admitting deletion and negative checks. This is done in a precise and
declarative way that uses existing typing results for stateless protocols as a
basis. To have a simple and yet powerful formalism to work with, we introduce a
notion of strands with set operations to model both honest agents and intruder
constraints. In the intruder constraints, this represents at which point particular
set operations occurred during an attack. We then show that we can reduce
the satisfiability of these intruder constraints to the satisfiability of constraint
systems without set operations. We can then make use of existing typing results.
A second contribution of this work is thus the formalisms with set opera-
tions for honest agents and for intruder constraints which are useful beyond the
typing result to represent and work with stateful protocols. While this formal-
ism is deliberately reduced to the essentials, we also show how to connect other
more complex formalisms for stateful protocols, namely using rewriting and pro-
cess calculi, so that our typing result can be also applied accordingly in these
languages.
1 An exception is [26], but this paper contains significant mistakes and its result does
not hold in this generality; we explain this in detail in section 5.4.
The paper is organized as follows. After preliminaries in section II we intro-
duce in section III a new strand-based protocol model for stateful protocols. In
section IV we extend intruder constraints with set operations and define a reduc-
tion mechanism on constraints that we prove sound and complete. We prove our
main theorem, the typing result, in section V. Finally, we have case studies and
connections to other formalisms in section VI and VII. A detailed description of
the formalization in Isabelle can be found in the appendices.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Term Algebra
We formally define a term algebra over a signature Σ containing symbols with
associated arities and over a countable set of variables V. The set of terms over
Σ with variables from V is denoted by TΣ(V) and we normally use the lower-case
letters t, s, m, and e to denote arbitrary terms. A term t ∈ TΣ(V) is then either
a variable t ∈ V or a composed term of the form f(t1, . . . , tn) for some f ∈ Σ of
arity n and ti ∈ TΣ(V). When we later define our protocol model we will allow
agents to send messages, modify sets, and emit events. We use terms to represent
all of these different concepts and so we do not at this level distinguish between
them.
The set Σ is partitioned into the public symbols Σpub (which the intruder
has access to) and the private symbols Σpriv (which the intruder cannot access).
By Σn we denote the set of symbols of arity n. Similarly, Σnpub (respectively
Σnpriv ) denotes the public (respectively private) symbols of arity n. The set of
constants C is defined as Σ0. The set of free variables fv(t) of a term t is defined
as usual and we say that t is ground iff fv(t) = ∅. As usual we extend fv to sets of
terms. Constants will usually be denoted by the lower-case letters a, b, c, i, and
k. We write f , g, and h as meta-variables ranging over non-constant symbols of
Σ and we use sans serif to denote the actual elements of Σ, e.g., ring and crypt.
We define substitutions as (finite or countably infinite) mappings from variables
to terms, and we write δ(x) for the application of substitution δ to variable
x. We usually use the letters δ and σ to denote substitutions. Substitutions
are further extended to terms and sets of terms homomorphically as expected.
The domain of a substitution δ is the set of variables which are not mapped to
themselves: dom(δ) = {x ∈ V | δ(x) 6= x}. The image of a substitution δ is then
defined as usual: img(δ) = δ(dom(δ)) = {δ(x) | x ∈ dom(δ)} and we say that
δ is ground when fv(img(δ)) = ∅. For substitutions with finite domain we often
write them as [x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn]. Note that we divert slightly from the
conventional definition by also allowing for substitutions with infinite domain.
Finally, a substitution δ is called a unifier of two terms t and t′ iff δ(t) = δ(t′).
2.2 Intruder Model
We now define a Dolev-Yao style intruder deduction relation whereM ` t means
that the intruder can derive the term t from the set of termsM called the intruder
knowledge. Our model is similar to standard Dolev-Yao models but we parame-
terize ours over arbitrary signatures Σ instead of fixing a particular set of crypto-
graphic primitives. Note also that we work in the free algebra; two terms are equal
iff they are syntactically equal. For these reasons we additionally parameterize
over an analysis theory Ana that serves as an analysis interface. For instance, to
decrypt the message crypt(k,m) and obtain m we can require that the inverse
key inv(k) must be provided, and we write Ana(crypt(k,m)) = ({inv(k)}, {m}) to
formally express this. Note that this would be similar to introducing a destructor
dcrypt and an algebraic equation dcrypt(inv(k), crypt(k,m)) ≈ m if we were not
using the free algebra. More generally, if Ana(t) = (K,T ) then the analysis of
the term t results in the terms in T provided that all “keys” in K can be derived.
Given such an Ana we define the deduction relation ` as the least relation closed




M ` t1 · · · M ` tn
M ` f (t1, . . . , tn)
(Compose),
f ∈ Σnpub
M ` t M ` k1 · · · M ` kn
M ` ti
(Decompose), ti ∈ T,
K = {k1, . . . , kn},
Ana(t) = (K,T )
Here, the (Axiom) rule expresses that the intruder can derive any message in his
knowledge. The rule (Compose) allows the intruder to compose messages with
any public symbol. For instance, if the intruder can derive a key k and a message
m from a given intruder knowledge M (that is, M ` k and M ` m) then he can
asymmetrically encrypt m with k, i.e.,M ` crypt(k,m). This rule also subsumes
derivation of public constants, e.g., agent names. The final rule, (Decompose),
defines decomposition or analysis of terms, and it expresses that the intruder
can decompose a derivable message t if he can derive the required keys K.
While the intruder deduction relation is defined for ground terms only, the
analysis interface is defined on terms that might contain variables. The analysis
interfaces we consider will be subject to some restrictions:
Ana1: Ana(x) = (∅, ∅) for variables x ∈ V,
Ana2: Ana(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = (K,T ) implies K is finite, T ⊆ {t1, . . . , tn}, and
fv(K) ⊆ fv(f(t1, . . . , tn)), and
Ana3: Ana(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = (K,T ) implies Ana(δ(f(t1, . . . , tn))) = (δ(K), δ(T )).
The first requirement, Ana1, ensures that variables cannot be decomposed. Ana2
consists of two parts. First, all terms in T must be immediate subterms of the
term being decomposed, and so the intruder cannot obtain any new terms by
decomposing something that he composed himself, and it is a technical require-
ment that is crucial in proofs of typing results. In fact, the typing result of [26]
has a counter-example because it lacks this requirement (see section 5.4). The
second part restricts the set of keys K to be finite and to not introduce any new
variables, but the keys are otherwise independent of the term being decomposed.
This is useful when modeling asymmetric decryption as we can then require the
intruder to derive the inverse key inv(k) of the key k used for the encryption.
Ana3 expresses that decomposition is invariant under substitution.
In concrete examples of this paper we use the following Ana theory on
the usual set of cryptographic primitives: Ana(crypt(k,m)) = ({inv(k)}, {m}),
Ana(scrypt(k,m)) = ({k}, {m}), Ana(sign(k,m)) = (∅, {m}), Ana(〈t, t′〉) = (∅, {t, t′})
where 〈·, ·〉 ∈ Σ2 is a pairing operator, and Ana(t) = (∅, ∅) for all other terms t.
3 Stateful Protocols
In this section we will define our protocol model. There are several protocol
models based on strands where protocol execution is defined in terms of a state
transition system, e.g., [15,1,19]. In these works a state is a set (or multi-set) of
strands that represents the honest agents, and a representation of the intruder
knowledge. We extend this model with strands that work with sets to model long-
term mutable state information. Thus a distinguishing feature of our strands is
that honest agents can query and update sets. A protocol state in our model
will thus contain not only short-term session information but also the long-term
contents of sets, and we call protocols based on these strands stateful.
3.1 Strands with Sets
We now define the syntax of strands with sets as an extension of [1] (the part of
the syntax marked with ? corresponds to the strands of [1]):
` : := φ.` |
?︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ.` | 0
with ψ : := send(t) | receive(t) | t .= t′ | ∀x¯. t 6 .= t′
and φ : := insert(t, s) | delete(t, s) | t ∈˙ s | ∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s |
assert(e) | event(e) | ∀x¯. ¬event(e)
where t, t′, s, e ∈ TΣ(V), and x¯ ranges over finite sequences x1, . . . , xn of variables
from V. Strands built according to the above grammar but using only the cases
marked with ? are referred to as ordinary strands. A strand consists of a sequence
of steps and we use here a process calculus notation where we delimit steps by
periods and mark the end of a strand with a 0. We normally omit writing the
end-marker 0 when it is obvious from the context. We will also omit writing the
quantifier ∀x¯ whenever x¯ is the empty sequence.
The steps can be categorized into four parts: the message transmission steps
(send and receive), the equality checks ( .= and 6 .=), the set operations (insert,
delete, ∈˙, and 6 ∈˙), and the event steps (assert, event, and ¬event). The most
basic ones are the message transmission steps which denote transmission over
an insecure network. A send(t) step then means that an agent transmits t and
receive(t) means that an agent waits for a message pattern (since it might con-
tain variables) of the form t. Like [1], we extend strands with equalities and
inequalities—they represent checks that must hold true to proceed—and a con-
struct for emitting events; assert(e). We further extend strands with steps for
checking whether an event has happened or not; event(e) and ¬event(e). Finally,
the main novel addition to the concept of strands are the set operations. They al-
low for updates (insert and delete) and queries (∈˙ and 6 ∈˙) of sets. Here, the delete
operation allows for removal of elements that have previously been inserted into
a set, and so the contents of sets do not grow monotonically during transitions.
This is in contrast to the messages that the intruder has seen, i.e., the messages
sent by honest agents; we cannot force the intruder to forget a message he has
learned. Similarly, we cannot retract an asserted event. Thus the set of events
and the messages sent over the network grow monotonically during transitions.
The set of terms occurring in a strand ` is denoted by trms(`). The events of
a strand ` is the set of terms ev(`) defined as ev(`) = {e | assert(e) occurs in `}.
The free variables, denoted by fv(`), are the variables occurring in ` which are not
bound by a universal quantifier, and when fv(`) = ∅ then ` is said to be closed.
In many formalisms like process calculi, variables in a receive step would also be
considered as bound variables. Since we, however, also express pattern matching
here (since we allow arbitrary terms in receive steps, and, in particular, the same
variable can occur in several receive steps and more than once), we like to refer
to all such variables as free variables, anyway. We will later introduce a notion of
well-formed constraints that requires all free variables to first occur in a receive
step or a positive check, and thus corresponds to a notion of closedness in other
formalisms. Moreover, given a substitution δ we can apply it to a constraint `
as expected, written δ(`), by applying δ to every free occurrence of a variable
in `. Note that the variables of a substitution δ might clash with the bound
variables occurring in a strand `, e.g., for δ = [y 7→ f(x)] and ` = ∀x. x 6 .= y
we have that δ(`) = ∀x. x 6 .= f(x). However, we can always avoid these issues
by variable-renaming. For simplicity we therefore assume that the bound and
free variables of strands are disjoint. Note also that we restrict ourselves here to
a “bare metal” formalism by discarding all notions that are not relevant to our
typing result. For instance, we have no notion of repetition, since one can simply
consider an infinite set of such strands. We then also do not need a construct
for creating fresh constants since we can simply consider a set of strands with
uniquely chosen constants. However, we do support an unbounded number of
sessions and freshly generated nonces, by modeling protocols as infinite set of
transaction strands. This is similar to Guttman’s original strand spaces [33]
that can model an infinite number of strands containing an infinite number of
fresh constants. The actual specification language for an end-user should include
constructs like creating fresh nonces and repetitions. For that reason we show in
section 7 how to connect to formalisms like Set-pi and AIF-ω.
3.2 A Keyserver Example
Before we proceed with the formal definition of our protocol model we introduce
a small keyserver protocol example adapted from [27]. In this protocol each
participant u has an associated keyring ring(u) of currently used public keys.
Any agent (or user) can register public keys with a trusted keyserver and these
public keys can later be revoked. The lifetime of a key may span multiple sessions,
but whenever it is revoked the corresponding private key will be publicly known,
and it should therefore not be used in a later session. Thus the keyserver needs
to maintain the current status of keys and to model this feature we consider sets
valid(u) and revoked(u) containing the valid respectively revoked keys for each
user u. As an initial rule of the protocol we model an out-of-band registration
of fresh keys (e.g., the user physically visits the server). Suppose we have a
(countably infinite) set of constants that represents the users. For every user u
and for every j ∈ N we then declare the strand:
insert(pku,j , ring(u)).insert(pku,j , valid(u)).send(pku,j) (T1)
where each pku,j is a public key. Here, j is a “session number” and pku,j represents
a fresh public key the user u “has created in session j”. This strand thus represents
that a user u can create a fresh key pku,j and insert it into its keyring, and the
server then additionally inserts the key into its own set of valid keys. Lastly, the
key is made public by sending it out.
We will later define the semantics of protocols by a state transition system,
where in the initial state all sets are empty and no messages have been sent.
Then for user u = a and session j = 1, the above strand would get us to a new
state where pka,1 is contained in ring(a) and valid(a) and the message pka,1 has
been sent. Note that we do not have any built-in notion of set ownership, so we
can model here strands that represent a mutual action of a user and the server.
As a second rule we model a key-revocation mechanism consisting of two
separate strands: one for the users and one for the server. In the first strand the
condition PK u,j ∈˙ ring(u) expresses that PK u,j can be any value in the keyring.
Not having any other condition, this models that the user can arbitrarily select
a key from its keyring. Then it generates a fresh key npku,j , inserts it into its
keyring, and sends the new key to the server, signed with the old key PK u,j :
PK u,j ∈˙ ring(u).insert(npku,j , ring(u)).send(sign(inv(PK u,j), 〈u,npku,j〉)) (T2)
for each user u and for each session j ∈ N. (Note that we also parameterize the
variables; later on, we will require that different strands have different variables.)
Rule T2 is, for instance, applicable to our concrete state where key pka,1 has
been registered: it gets us to a new state where npka,1 has been added to ring(a)
and the message sign(inv(pka,1), 〈a,npka,1〉) has now been sent.
Afterwards, in the second strand, it is the keyserver’s turn to act and its ac-
tions are initiated by an incoming message of the form sign(inv(PK i), 〈Ui,NPK i〉):
receive(sign(inv(PK i), 〈Ui,NPK i〉)).
(∀Ai. NPK i 6 ∈˙ valid(Ai)).(∀Ai. NPK i 6 ∈˙ revoked(Ai)).
PK i ∈˙ valid(Ui).insert(NPK i, valid(Ui)).
insert(PK i, revoked(Ui)).delete(PK i, valid(Ui)).
send(inv(PK i)) (T3)
for each i ∈ N. Again, this rule is applicable to the concrete state reached above,
moves the value pka,1 from valid(a) to revoked(a), and inserts npka,1 into valid(a).
Finally, the server discloses the private key inv(pka,1); while this is of course not
done in an actual implementation, it expresses that this protocol is secure even
if the intruder learns the private key to an old revoked key.
3.3 Transaction Strands
One may wonder about the execution model for the strands from the previous
example, in particular if that could cause race conditions on the checks and
modifications of the sets if parallel execution of several strands leads to some
interleaving of the respective set operations. Suppose for instance, in our key-
server example, that we register the key pka,1 using strand T1, and then send
out the messages sign(inv(pka,1), 〈a,npka,i〉) for i ∈ {1, 2} using T2. Then pka,1
is in valid(a) and ring(a) contains the keys pka,1, npka,1, and npka,2. If we now
run two instances of the strand T3, one for each of the signatures, and we as-
sume that they are executed step-by-step instead of one atomic block, then we
could end up in a state where both npka,1 and npka,2 have been registered at the
keyserver (i.e., inserted into valid(a)) but only one public key, pka,1, has been
revoked, because both instances of T3 can perform all their checks before up-
dating their databases. In fact, as we will define formally in the next subsection,
we adopt a transaction semantics: a transaction strand (or just transaction) is
defined to be a strand of the form receive(T ).L.send(T ′) where T and T ′ are
finite sets of terms, L is a strand that does not contain any send or receive steps,
and where we write receive({t1, . . . , tn}) as an abbreviation for receive(t1). · · · .
receive(tn) (similarly for send steps). The idea is that such a transaction is always
performed atomically, i.e., as a single transition. This reflects, in our opinion,
very well the normal work-flow of a web server with a database: the server re-
ceives an incoming request, performs some lookups and checks on its database
(possibly aborting the transaction), then performs some modifications on its
database, and sends a reply (which may be also a request to another server).
The key is that the server serializes the handling of such transactions (to avoid
said race conditions). A transaction semantics allows us to abstract from the im-
plementation of such serialization mechanisms and thus focus on the verification
of a larger system. Another example are crypto APIs, where a token receives
an API command, performs some lookups and checks in its memory (possibly
aborting the transaction), performs some updates to its memory and then gives
out a result. Also here, we typically do not want to reason about race conditions
from several API calls in parallel.
This is indeed slightly different from the “philosophy” of many process cal-
culus approaches (e.g., StatVerif [3] and Set-pi [12]) where one would have to
introduce explicit locking mechanisms. Also, the original notion of strand spaces
by Guttman [33] is actually based on a notion of only a partial (instead of a
total) order on send and receive steps in an execution; if we regard however
set operations as interactions with a database with locking, then we obtain the
partial order that our transaction semantics defines.
3.4 Transition Systems
Now that we have introduced the elements of our protocols we define a protocol
S to be a countable set of transaction strands where no variable occurs in two
different strands. The set of terms trms(S) occurring in S is defined as expected.
Before giving the formal definition of the transition system we will first define
the notion of a database mapping D to be a finite set of pairs (t, s) of terms, and
for closed strands ` we define the ground database mapping db(`) as
db(`) = {(t, s) | insert(t, s).`′ is a suffix of `
and delete(t, s) does not occur in `′}
LetD = {(t1, s1), . . . , (tn, sn)} be a database mapping and ` a closed strand, then
we may write db(insert(D).`) as a shorthand for db(insert(t1, s1). · · · .insert(tn, sn).`).
States in the (ground) transition system are of the form (S;M,D,E) where
S is a protocol, M is the set of messages that has been sent over the network
and that we also refer to as the intruder knowledge, D is a database mapping
representing the state of all databases, and E is the set of events that have
occurred. The initial state is (S0; ∅, ∅, ∅) for a protocol S0.
Definition 1. A transition relation on states is defined as:
(S;M,D,E) σ,`=⇒ (S \ {`};M ∪ σ(T ′), D′, E′)
where D′ = db(insert(D).σ(L)) and E′ = E ∪ ev(σ(L)))
if the following conditions are met:
C1: ` = receive(T ).L.send(T ′) ∈ S is a transaction strand,
C2: σ is a ground substitution with domain fv(`),
C3: M ` σ(t) for all terms t ∈ T ,
C4: σ(t) = σ(t′) for all steps t .= t′ occurring in L,
C5: σ(δ(t)) 6= σ(δ(t′)) for all steps ∀x¯. t 6 .= t′ occurring in L and all ground
substitutions δ with domain x¯,
C6: σ((t, s)) ∈ db(insert(D).σ(L′)) for all prefixes L′.(t ∈˙ s) of L,
C7: σ(δ((t, s))) /∈ db(insert(D).σ(L′)) for all prefixes L′.(∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s) of L and all
ground substitutions δ with domain x¯,
C8: σ(t) ∈ E ∪ ev(σ(L′)) for all prefixes L′.event(t) of L,
C9: σ(δ(t)) /∈ E∪ev(σ(L′)) for all prefixes L′.(∀x¯. ¬event(t)) of L and all ground
substitutions δ with domain x¯.
Here the first side-condition C1 simply ensures that ` is actually a transaction
strand of the protocol, and the second condition C2 ensures that σ is actually an
assignment of the free variables in ` to concrete values. Condition C3 states that
the intruder must be able to derive the messages that ` expects to receive. The
conditions C4 to C9 state that all checks and set updates performed by ` are
satisfied under σ. As the effect of a transition the strand ` is removed from S,
the intruder learns σ(T ′), the asserted events of σ(L) are added to the successor
state, and the databases are updated according to the set operations of σ(L).
Note that the whole transaction strand ` is “consumed” in each transition be-
cause we want the strands of protocols to be atomic transactions. This is differ-
ent from other strand-based approaches in which a transition only eliminates one
step of a strand and in which strands might contain multiple transactions (e.g.,
from a state containing the protocol {PK .= pka,1.receive(npka,1).send(PK )} we
can reach a state containing {receive(npka,1).send(PK )} and where PK must
be mapped to pka,1). Defining our protocol semantics on a transactional level,
however, is without loss of generality: it is always possible to refine a strand
into smaller transaction strands while preserving the causal relationship of the
original strand (i.e., transaction i + 1 of a strand with n transactions can only
be performed after transaction i, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}). For instance,
one can insert additional message-transmissions between steps, e.g., the strand
PK
.
= pka,1.receive(npka,1).send(PK ) can be split into two transactions, namely
PK
.
= pka,1.send(f(PK )) and receive(f(PK )).receive(npka,1).send(PK ) where f
is a fresh private symbol of arity one that we here use to preserve the causal
relationship and to carry state information. In general, to split a strand `1. · · · .`n
containing transaction strands `i we can add additional steps that carry state
information from `i to `i+1 and which ensure that `i can only be performed af-
ter `i+1: `i.send(state`i(x1, . . . , xm)) and receive(state`i(x1, . . . , xm)).`i+1, where
state`i ∈ Σmpriv is private and unique to `i and where fv(`i) = {x1, . . . , xm}. Such
a transformation can also be used to link transactions `1, . . . , `n together, or to
split a transaction strand into smaller transactions if one wishes to have greater
granularity in state transitions. For tools based on transaction strands such an
encoding would be useful; it would be convenient for users if they are allowed
to specify strands containing multiple transactions. In this paper, however, we
will not provide such an input language for a tool—rather, we have decided
to keep the protocol model simple by only allowing single-transaction strands.
This decision is legitimate, in our opinion, since the above encoding for linking
transactions can easily be automated and be transparent to end-users.
Finally, we note that protocol goals such as secrecy can also be encoded as




for each honest user h and i ∈ N, and an event attack that denotes when an attack
has happened. Hence, if the private key of a valid public key for an honest agent
is leaked then there is a violation of secrecy, and in those cases we emit the
event attack using the construct assert. In other words, if there is a reachable
state (S;M,D,E) in which attack ∈ E then the protocol has a vulnerability. In
principle we support all properties expressible in the geometric fragment [1] over
events. This includes many reachability goals like authentication.
4 Symbolic Constraints
At the core of all typing results is a sound and complete constraint reduction
system. It was originally used as an efficient procedure for model-checking of
security protocols [24,31,6], but is also used as a proof technique when proving
relative soundness results such as [14,26,2,1,19]. The constraints themselves arise
from the symbolic exploration of the protocol state space where each symbolic
state contains a constraint that represents the steps taken in the protocol so far.
Any solution to a reachable constraint then represents (one or several) concrete
runs of the protocol. In this section we consider constraints for stateful protocols.
4.1 Syntax and Semantics
The most basic parts of a symbolic constraint are requirements on the intruder to
produce messages that honest agents expect to receive. For instance, if the mes-
sagesm1, . . . ,mn (where eachmi might contain variables) have been sent out and
some agent expects to receive a message pattern t it is standard to represent as a
constraint the requirement on the intruder to produce t given the mi. Any solu-
tion I to such a constraint is an assignment of the variables fv({m1, . . . ,mn, t})
to ground terms such that I({m1, . . . ,mn}) ` I(t) holds. In [19] there was the
idea to represent a (finite) set of such constraints by a strand, with send steps
for messages the intruder has to generate, and receive steps for messages that
the intruder learns (all in the order this happens), e.g., the constraint we just
explained can be represented as the strand receive(m1). · · · .receive(mn).send(t).
We additionally want to handle strands with sets, and so we also just insert all
the set operations (and similarly the checks and event assertions) into the in-
truder strands in the order they happen in a concrete execution. With this, our
constraints are just like the strands for honest agents but with the direction of
send and receive steps inverted, i.e., a send step from an honest agent becomes
a receive step in our constraints and vice versa. For these reasons we define the
syntax of our constraints to range over strands. Similarly to the ordinary strands
we call constraints that only contains receive, send, equalities, and inequalities
for ordinary constraints. We will often reuse the operations defined on strands
for symbolic constraints, since they share the same syntax, and we also make
the assumption that the bound variables occurring in a constraint are disjoint
from its free variables. Moreover, we define the intruder knowledge ik(A) of a
constraint A as the set of received messages: ik(A) = {t | receive(t) occurs in A}.
An interpretation I for a constraint A (or just an interpretation if dom(I) =
V) is now defined to be a substitution such that fv(A) ⊆ dom(I) and img(I) is
ground. We then inductively define a model relation |=M,D,E between interpre-
tations and constraints where M , D, and E are respectively the initial intruder
knowledge, state of databases, and events—see Definition 2.
Finally, we say that an interpretation I is a model of (or solution to) a
constraint A, written I |= A, iff I |=∅,∅,∅ A.
We can now prove some useful lemmas about the constraint semantics. First,
we have a lemma that we frequently apply in proofs (without explicitly refer-
encing it) that allows us to split and merge constraints:
Lemma 1. Given a ground set of terms M , a ground database mapping D, a
ground set E of asserted events, an interpretation I, and symbolic constraints
Definition 2 (Constraint semantics).
I |=M,D,E 0 iff true
I |=M,D,E send(t).A iff M ` I(t) and I |=M,D,E A
I |=M,D,E receive(t).A iff I |=M∪{I(t)},D,E A
I |=M,D,E t .= t′.A iff I(t) = I(t′) and I |=M,D,E A
I |=M,D,E (∀x¯. t 6 .= t′).A iff I |=M,D,E A and
I(δ(t)) 6= I(δ(t′)) for all ground δ with domain x¯
I |=M,D,E insert(t, s).A iff I |=M,D∪{I((t,s))},E A
I |=M,D,E delete(t, s).A iff I |=M,D\{I((t,s))},E A
I |=M,D,E t ∈˙ s.A iff I((t, s)) ∈ D and I |=M,D,E A
I |=M,D,E (∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s).A iff I |=M,D,E A and
I(δ((t, s))) /∈ D for all ground δ with domain x¯
I |=M,D,E assert(e).A iff I |=M,D,E∪{I(e)} A
I |=M,D,E event(e).A iff I(e) ∈ E and I |=M,D,E A
I |=M,D,E (∀x¯. ¬event(e)).A iff I |=M,D,E A and
I(δ(e)) /∈ E for all ground δ with domain x¯
A and A′, the following holds:
I |=M,D,E A.A′ iff I |=M,D,E A and I |=M ′,D′,E′ A′
where M ′ = M ∪ ik(I(A)), D′ = db(insert(D).I(A)),
and E′ = E ∪ ev(I(A))
Secondly, we can prove a useful relationship between the side-conditions C1 to
C9 of the ground transition system and the constraint semantics. First we define
the notion of the dual of a strand S by “swapping” the direction of receive and
send steps. Formally, dual(s) denotes the dual of the strand step s defined such
that dual(receive(t)) = send(t), dual(send(t)) = receive(t), and dual(s) = s for
any other step s. It is then extended homomorphically to strands as expected. We
will interpret dual strands as symbolic constraints and under this interpretation
we can prove the following relationship:
Lemma 2. Given a ground state (S;M,D,E), a transaction strand ` ∈ S (con-
dition C1), and a ground substitution σ with domain fv(`) (condition C2), then
the conditions C3 to C9 hold if and only if σ |=M,D,E dual(`).
4.2 Symbolic Transition System
Now that we have defined the syntax and semantics of constraints we can con-
struct a protocol transition system in which we build up constraints during
transitions. In this symbolic transition system a symbolic state (S;A) consists
of a protocol S and a constraint A, and the initial state (S0; 0) then consists of
the initial protocol S0 and the empty constraint 0. During transitions we then
build up a constraint by interpreting dual honest-agent strands as constraints:
Definition 3. A transition relation on symbolic states is defined as:
(S;A) `=⇒• (S \ {`};A.dual(`)) if ` ∈ S
We will now impose a well-formedness requirement on protocols; variables
in honest-agent strands must either originate from a received message or in
a positive check (e.g., a set query). In ordinary protocols there is nothing non-
deterministic in the behavior of honest agents, so all free variables in their strands
shall first occur in messages they receive. Now that we add set operations, we
extend well-formedness naturally to set comprehensions: a set-membership check
like x ∈˙ s allows the agent to non-deterministically choose any element from s for
x—unless x is already constrained before, thus limiting the choice accordingly.
We also require that reachable constraints in the symbolic transition system
are of a well-formed kind that is dual to the well-formedness of protocols; every
free variable of a constraint represents either a message that depends on choices
the intruder can make (e.g., variables originating from send steps), or originates
from a positive check. To that end we formally define constraint well-formedness
first and then use this definition to define protocol well-formedness:
Definition 4. A constraint A is well-formed w.r.t. variables X (or simply well-
formed when X = ∅) iff wf X(A) where
wf X(0) iff true
wf X(send(t).A) iff wf X∪fv(t)(A)
wf X(receive(t).A) iff fv(t) ⊆ X and wf X(A)
wf X(t
.
= t′.A) iff fv(t′) ⊆ X and wf X∪fv(t)(A)
wf X(insert(t, s).A) iff fv(t) ∪ fv(s) ⊆ X and wf X(A)
wf X(delete(t, s).A) iff fv(t) ∪ fv(s) ⊆ X and wf X(A)
wf X(t ∈˙ s.A) iff wf X∪fv(t)∪fv(s)(A)
wf X(assert(t).A) iff fv(t) ⊆ X and wf X(A)
wf X(event(t).A) iff wf X∪fv(t)(A)
wf X(a.A) iff wf X(A) otherwise
Here the set X collects the variables that have occurred in send steps or positive
checks. In other words, every free variable of a well-formed constraint originates
from either a send step, a ∈˙ step, an event step, or at the left-hand side of a .= step
(or a negative check such as an inequality, but in those cases the new variables
cannot be used elsewhere). We can then reuse the definition of well-formedness
of constraints to formally define a notion of well-formedness of protocols:
Definition 5. A protocol S is well-formed iff for all strands ` ∈ S the symbolic
constraint dual(`) is well-formed.
Note that the well-formedness requirement on t ∈˙ s allows us to model protocols
where we pick arbitrary elements from sets—as in the keyserver example.
Well-formedness of reachable constraints is now easy to prove. We write
w
=⇒∗ here to denote the reflexive-transitive closure of ·=⇒ where the label w =
(σ1, `1), . . . , (σn, `n) denotes a sequence of transition labels, and similarly
w′
=⇒•∗
denotes the reflexive-transitive closure of ·=⇒• where w′ = `1, . . . , `n.
Lemma 3 (Well-formedness of reachable symbolic constraints). If S0 is
a well-formed protocol and (S0; 0) w=⇒•∗ (S;A) then A is a well-formed symbolic
constraint and S is a well-formed protocol.
We now prove that the symbolic and ground transition systems are equiv-
alent. Essentially, if we consider for every reachable symbolic state (S;A) and ev-
ery model I ofA the corresponding ground state (S; ik(I(A)), db(I(A)), ev(I(A))),
then we obtain exactly the reachable states of the ground transition system:
Theorem 1 (Equivalence of transition systems). For any protocol S0,
{(S;M,D,E) | ∃w. (S0; ∅, ∅, ∅) w=⇒∗ (S;M,D,E)} =
{(S; ik(I(A)), db(I(A)), ev(I(A))) | ∃w. (S0; 0) w=⇒•∗ (S;A) and I |= A}
4.3 Reduction to Ordinary Constraints
Definition 6 (Translation of symbolic constraints). Given a constraint A
its translation into ordinary constraints is denoted by tr(A) = tr∅,∅(A) where:
trD,E(0) = {0}
trD,E(insert(t, s).A) = trD∪{(t,s)},E(A)
trD,E(delete(t, s).A) = {(t, s) .= d1. · · · .(t, s) .= di.
(t, s) 6 .= di+1. · · · .(t, s) 6 .= dn.A′ |
D = {d1, . . . , di, . . . , dn}, 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
A′ ∈ trD\{d1,...,di},E(A)}
trD,E(t ∈˙ s.A) = {(t, s) .= d.A′ | d ∈ D,A′ ∈ trD,E(A)}
trD,E((∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s).A) = {(∀x¯. (t, s) 6 .= d1). · · · .(∀x¯. (t, s) 6 .= dn).A′ |
D = {d1, . . . , dn}, 0 ≤ n,A′ ∈ trD,E(A)}
trD,E(assert(e).A) = trD,E∪{e}(A)
trD,E(event(e).A) = {e .= e′.A′ | e′ ∈ E,A′ ∈ trD,E(A)}
trD,E((∀x¯. ¬event(e)).A) = {(∀x¯. e 6 .= e1). · · · .(∀x¯. e 6 .= en).A′ |
E = {e1, . . . , en}, 0 ≤ n,A′ ∈ trD,E(A)}
trD,E(a.A) = {a.A′ | A′ ∈ trD,E(A)} otherwise
The key to our typing result—that allows us to benefit from existing typing
results—is to first reduce the problem of solving general intruder constraints
(with set operations) to solving ordinary intruder constraints (without set oper-
ations). To that end we introduce a sound and complete translation mechanism
that removes the stateful parts of constraints, for instance those reachable in
·
=⇒•∗. The translation tr(·) is then defined in Definition 6 where D is a database
mapping and E is a set of events that records what has occurred in the constraint
so far. Intuitively, the set trD,E(·) of reduced constraints represents a disjunc-
tion of ordinary constraints, and since we cannot represent disjunctions in our
constraints we use sets instead. Note also that D and E will always be finite and
that this does not mean that we are restricting ourselves to only finitely many
sessions. Rather, in each protocol execution only finitely many things have hap-
pened and D and E then represents the state of the sets and events respectively.
Hence the translation always produces a finite set and for this reason we can
interpret the set as a finite disjunction of constraints.
We will now explain how each set operation is translated (the event steps
are translated similarly). The purpose of the translation tr(A) is to capture pre-
cisely the models of A using only a finite number of ordinary constraints, so we
will proceed with the explanation with this in mind. The simplest case is the
insert(t, s) case, and here we record the insertion for the remaining translation.
Now consider the t ∈˙ s case. For any model I of t ∈˙ s with a given database
mapping D = {(t1, s1), . . . , (tn, sn)} (where each entry of D might contain vari-
ables) we know that I((t, s)) ∈ I(D). In other words, some check (t, s) .= d for
some d in D has I as a model if and only if t ∈˙ s has I as a model, and by
then constructing one constraint for each di ∈ D where we require (t, s) .= di we
get the desired result. For the ∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s case we know that I(δ(t)) 6= I(δ(t′)) or
I(δ(s)) 6= I(δ(s′)) for any (t′, s′) ∈ D and ground substitution δ with domain x¯.
In other words, I(δ((t, s))) 6= I(δ((t′, s′))) for all (t′, s′) ∈ D and this is exactly
what the translation expresses. We also have to make sure that the newly intro-
duced quantified constraints do not capture any variables of D. This is, in fact,
the case for all constraints reachable in our symbolic transition system, since
we have previously assumed all strands of protocols to have disjoint variables
from each other and also that the bound and free variables of strands are disjoint.
Thus this property also holds for the reachable constraints. The most interesting
case is the translation of delete(t, s) steps. Since terms may contain variables we
do not know a priori which insertions to remove from D, but we still need to en-
sure that t has actually been removed from the set s in the remaining constraint
translation—otherwise the translation would be unsound. We accomplish this by
partitioning the insertions D into those {d1, . . . , di} that must be equal to (t, s)
in the remaining translation and the remaining D \{d1, . . . , di} that are unequal
to (t, s), and we thus add equality and inequality constraints to express this par-
titioning. Consequently, we then remove {d1, . . . , di} from D for the remaining
translation. Note that there will in general be cases where the choice of parti-
tioning results in an unsatisfiable constraint, but since we construct constraints
for all possibilities the translation still captures exactly the models of the origi-
nal constraint. Note also that this partitioning of D implies that an exponential
number of constraints are constructed in this case, namely one for each subset
of D. The translation is meant to be used purely as a problem reduction—in a
verification procedure one could ensure that trivially unsatisfiable translations
are ignored to reduce the number of produced constraints.
Finally, we show that tr is indeed a reduction, i.e., that tr(A) captures exactly
the models of A, and that tr preserves well-formedness:
Theorem 2 (Semantic equivalence of constraints and their transla-
tion). I |= A if and only if there exists A′ ∈ tr(A) such that I |= A′. Also, if
A is well-formed and A′ ∈ tr(A) then A′ is well-formed.
5 Lifting Typing Results to Stateful Protocols
So far everything has been untyped. We will now consider a simple type system
in which we annotate terms with types. In particular, each message pattern that
an honest agent in a protocol expects to receive will have an intended type, and in
a typed model we restrict all substitutions to well-typed ones. In a typed model
the intruder is therefore effectively restricted to only sending messages which
conform to the types. For protocols that satisfy a syntactic requirement—type-
flaw resistance—we then prove that this restriction is sound, and this result
we call a typing result. For proving our result we use the reduction tr from
constraints with sets to ordinary constraints, enabling us to use existing typing
results for protocols without sets and “lift” them to stateful protocols.
5.1 Typed Model
The type system we introduce now uses a structure for types which is similar to
the structure of terms (and so we will be able to reuse all notions of terms for
types as expected). Recall that our notion of terms are parameterized over a set
Σ of symbols. The idea is to use almost the same notion for our types, only not
allowing constants C ⊆ Σ and variables in types and instead use a finite set of
atomic types Ta that could include, for instance, agent. In addition to atomic
types we also have composed types. For instance, in our running example we use
private keys of the form inv(PK ). This term has the composed type inv(value),
where PK has type value. We can also assign the type inv(value) to variables
and we are therefore not limited to only using atomic keys.
We define the intended types of a protocol specification by a typing function
Γ that assigns a type to every term; it can be any function that satisfies the
following properties:
1. Γ (c) ∈ Ta for every c ∈ C.
2. Γ (f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(Γ (t1), . . . , Γ (tn)) for every f ∈ Σn \ C and terms ti.
The first of these axioms assigns atomic types to constants whereas the sec-
ond axiom assigns composed types to composed terms. We also assign types to
variables and we only require here that symbols occurring in a type have been
applied with the correct number of parameters, and that constants from C do
not appear in the types of variables. The function Γ is moreover extended to
sets of terms as expected.
For instance, in our running example we might define Ta = {value, agent,
attacktype} where Γ (a) = agent for all users and servers a, Γ (pk) = value for
any element pk of a set, and Γ (attack) = attacktype. Similarly, the variables Ui
have type agent and the variables PK u,j , PK i, and NPK i have type value. All
short-term public keys have type value and all short-term private keys have type
inv(value). Since we use terms to model families of sets we have as a consequence
that, e.g., keyrings of the form ring(u), for users u, have type ring(agent).
For the typing result to hold we need to ensure that the intruder always has
access to arbitrarily many terms of any type (otherwise he would not necessarily
be able to always make a well-typed choice). More formally, we partition the
set of public constants Cpub into the countably infinite sets Cα1pub , . . . , Cαnpub where
Ta = {α1, . . . , αn} and Γ (Cαipub) = {αi} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This models that
the intruder has access to an unbounded supply of fresh constants of any atomic
type. To ensure the same for composed types, there is a small technical problem,
namely that we want functions like inv(·) to be private, but this would lead
to a quite complicated model to ensure that the intruder can do this. So for
the sake of this section we make the following technical restriction: we assume
that all non-constant function symbols Σ \ C are public. To model a private
function f of arity n > 0, we can encode as a public function symbol f ′ of arity
n+1 where the additional argument is filled in all protocol strands with a secret
constant secf that the intruder does not know. Note that this simple encoding
of private functions is merely used here in the typing result section to make the
development smooth. With this construction the intruder can always generate
well-typed instances of any type.
Finally, in the typed model we restrict ourselves to only consider well-typed
solutions to intruder constraints. To capture this idea we define a predicate on
substitutions stating that every variable is mapped to a term of the same type
for substitutions satisfying this property:
Definition 7. A substitution δ is well-typed iff Γ (x) = Γ (δ(x)) for all x ∈ V.
Conversely, substitutions that are not well-typed are ill-typed.
5.2 Type-Flaw Resistance
In this subsection we will define a sufficient syntactical condition for protocols
(i.e., verifying the condition does not require an exploration of the state space
of a protocol) that allows us to prove our typing result for protocols that have
this property. This condition will be named type-flaw resistance and it is similar
to the typing result conditions of [1,19].
First, we will define a set of sub-message patterns SMP(M) for sets of message
patterns M :
Definition 8 (Sub-message patterns). The set of sub-message patterns,
SMP(M), of a set of terms M is the least set closed under the following rules:
1. If t ∈M then t ∈ SMP(M)
2. If t ∈ SMP(M) and t′ is a subterm of t then t′ ∈ SMP(M)
3. If t ∈ SMP(M) and δ is a well-typed substitution then δ(t) ∈ SMP(M)
4. If t ∈ SMP(M) and Ana(t) = (K,T ) then K ⊆ SMP(M)
The intention is that we can apply SMP to the message patterns trms(S) of a
protocol S, and SMP(trms(S)) is then an over-approximation of the messages
that the intruder might ever learn from the honest agents of S (or send out to the
honest agents) in any well-typed protocol run. The definition is generalized over
an arbitrary set of terms, so that we can also apply SMP to messages occurring in
a strand or a constraint. Consider, for instance, the set of sub-message patterns
SMP(trms(A)) built from the terms that occur in some well-formed constraint
A. The set then covers all message patterns of every message that might be
sent over the network, and any pattern in a check made by an honest agent, for
well-typed choices of the variables in the patterns.
Note that we also close the set of sub-message patterns under terms occurring
during decomposition. (For proving a typing result for ordinary constraints one
should prove that the constraints arising through constraint reductions never “fall
out” of the set of sub-message patterns. Here one needs to make sure that the
terms arising from decomposition are also captured by the sub-message patterns,
since the keys usually end up in a reachable constraint in the constraint reduction
system.) Since we assume that the terms obtained from a decomposition must
be subterms of the original term, however, we already cover those terms in
the second rule of Definition 8 and so we only include the keys used during
decomposition in the fourth rule.
We will now require that all pairs t, t′ of sub-message patterns that are not
variables (i.e., are non-variable) can only be unified if their types match, and this
will be our main condition of type-flaw resistance. This is a sufficient requirement
to distinguish terms of different types and it therefore enables us to argue that
ill-typed choices are unnecessary. In a nutshell, the typing result works as follows:
with the condition of type-flaw resistance we ensure that the intruder cannot take
a message generated by an honest agent (or a non-variable subterm of it) and
use it in a different “context” of the protocol, i.e., a non-variable subterm of a
different type. The constraint-based representation then allows one to argue that
no attack relies on an ill-typed choice by the intruder: one can show that there is
a sound, complete, and terminating reduction procedure for (ordinary) intruder
constraints that will instantiate variables only upon unification of two elements of
SMP—and such a unifier is guaranteed to be well-typed for a type-flaw resistant
protocol. All remaining uninstantiated variables can be instantiated arbitrarily
by the intruder, in particular in a well-typed way. Thus one can conclude that
there is a well-typed solution if there is one at all.
Definition 9 (Type-flaw resistance). First, let the set operation tuples of a
constraint (or strand) A be defined as:
setops(A) = {(t, s) | insert(t, s) or delete(t, s) or t ∈˙ s or
(∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s) for some x¯ occurs in A}





Then we define type-flaw resistance as follows:2
1. A set of terms M is type-flaw resistant iff for all t, t′ ∈ SMP(M)\V it holds
that Γ (t) = Γ (t′) if t and t′ are unifiable.
2. A strand (or constraint) A is type-flaw resistant iff trms(A) ∪ setops(A) is
type-flaw resistant, and for any terms t, t′ and variable sequences x¯:
2 Note that this definition is slightly different from the type-flaw resistance condition
of [20]. This is because we were able to generalize the condition slightly after further
research.
(a) If t .= t′ occurs in A then Γ (t) = Γ (t′) if t and t′ are unifiable.
(b) If insert(t, t′) or delete(t, t′) occurs in A then Γ (fv(t) ∪ fv(t′)) ⊆ Ta.
(c) If ∀x¯. t 6 .= t′ or ∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ t′ occurs in A then Γ ((fv(t) ∪ fv(t′)) \ x¯) ⊆ Ta.
(d) If assert(t) occurs in A then t /∈ V and Γ (fv(t)) ⊆ Ta.
(e) If event(t) occurs in A then t /∈ V.
(f) If ∀x¯. ¬event(t) occurs in A then Γ (fv(t) \ x¯) ⊆ Ta.
3. A protocol S is type-flaw resistant iff the set trms(S)∪setops(S) is type-flaw
resistant and for all ` ∈ S the strand ` is type-flaw resistant.
The main type-flaw resistance condition is defined in Definition 9(1) and it
states that matching pairs of messages that might occur in a protocol run must
have the same type. For equality steps t .= t′ any solution I must be a unifier of
t and t′, and so they should have the same type. If t .= t′ is unsatisfiable (i.e.,
t and t′ are not unifiable) then their types do not matter. Hence we can later
prove that our reduction tr preserves type-flaw resistance, even if tr produces
some unsatisfiable equality steps. For inequality steps ∀x¯. t 6 .= t′ we only need
to require that the variables occurring in t and t′ (but not x¯) are atomic. For
the remaining constraint steps note that when we translate a set operation such
as delete(t, s) we construct steps of the form (t, s) .= (t′, s′) and (t, s) 6 .= (t′, s′).
Thus we must require all variables of t, t′, s, and s′ to be atomic, and if (t, s)
and (t′, s′) are unifiable then they should have the same type. By requiring that
the set trms(A)∪setops(A) is type-flaw resistant we have that the translated set
operations must have the same type if they are unifiable. Similar conditions are
needed for the event steps, but we can here relax the requirements slightly since
their translations are simpler. Finally, a protocol is type-flaw resistant whenever
its strands are, and we must additionally require here that trms(S) ∪ setops(S)
is type-flaw resistant because terms from different strands might be unifiable.
Note that if we allow for composed types for variables in inequalities then we
can easily construct constraints which only have ill-typed solutions. For instance,
consider the inequality ∀x. y 6 .= f(x) where Γ (y) = f(Γ (x)). For any instance
f(c) of y where Γ (f(c)) = Γ (y) there is an instance of x (namely c) that does not
satisfy the inequality. Hence the constraint has no well-typed solution. However,
there does exist ill-typed solutions; since we are working in the free algebra terms
are equal if and only if they are syntactically equal, and hence any instance of
y that is not of the form f(c) for some c would be a solution to the inequality.
[26] has no such restrictions on the type of universally quantified variables and
we thus found a counter-example to its typing result (see section 5.4). Thus it
seems that a typing result for stateful protocols necessarily requires a carefully
restricted setting like our set-based approach.
As an example of type-flaw resistance we show that the keyserver protocol is
type-flaw resistant. One approach to proving type-flaw resistance of a protocol S
is to first find a set of strand stepsM that subsumes the steps of S as well-typed
instances. By proving type-flaw resistance of all steps in M , and of the set of
terms occurring in M , we can conclude that S must be type-flaw resistant. For
our example we can consider the following set, where Γ ({A,S, U}) = {agent}
and Γ (PK ) = value:
M = {assert(attack), delete(PK , valid(U)),
∀A. PK 6 ∈˙ revoked(A),∀A. PK 6 ∈˙ valid(A),
insert(PK , valid(U)), insert(PK , ring(U)),
insert(PK , revoked(U)),PK ∈˙ valid(U),PK ∈˙ ring(U),
receive(inv(PK )), receive(sign(inv(PK ), 〈U,PK 〉)),
send(inv(PK )), send(PK ), send(sign(inv(PK ), 〈U,PK 〉))}
Hence all variables have atomic type and so the non-constant, non-variable sub-
message patterns ofM consist of the composed terms and subterms closed under
well-typed variable renaming and well-typed instantiation of the variables with
constants. It is easy to see that each pair of non-variable terms among these
composed sub-message patterns have the same type if they are unifiable. Thus
the total set of terms of the protocol—and in each strand—is type-flaw resistant.
What remains to be shown is that each strand step inM satisfy requirements
2(b) to 2(d) of Definition 9 (the remaining requirements are vacuously satisfied).
The only event step occurring in M is assert(attack), and so 2(d) is satisfied.
For the set operations occurring in M it is easy to see that the set terms are
composed and only contains variables of atomic type, and that all elements PK
of sets are of type value. Thus the final requirements, 2(b) and 2(c), are also
satisfied.
In general, type-flaw resistance is in our opinion a reasonable property to
require from protocols and their implementations: most importantly one should
not have messages that encrypt raw data, like a nonce or a key, without any bit of
information what the data means, because this opens the door for the intruder to
reuse messages from honest agents that he cannot produce himself (and whose
precise content he may not even know) in a different context. In fact, most
concrete implementations satisfy this. Our result extends previous typing results
in the scope of protocols that can be considered to stateful protocols; the type-
flaw resistance requirement is thus also extended accordingly, however this is in
some sense also conservative: all protocols that are type-flaw resistant according
to the notion of [19] are also type-flaw resistant according to our Definition 9. In
a nutshell, the additional requirements for set operations and events are simply
to exclude that sets and events can be used as an “unchecked side-channel” where
type-flaws attacks can creep in. The requirements on set operations are, in fact,
only as strict as the requirements on inequalities and the tuples (·, ·) that arise in
the translation tr . In particular, we support arbitrary types for set elements—the
only restrictions being that the variables in set elements have atomic types and
that unifiable set elements in the same set have the same type. Thus we support
set elements of atomic types, composed types, and even non-homogeneous sets
(i.e., sets containing elements of different types). In the extended version [21] we
give further examples to illustrate that our notion works on real-world examples.
Finally, we prove that reachable constraints A, and their translations tr(A),
are type-flaw resistant whenever the initial protocol is:
Lemma 4 (Type-flaw resistance preservation). If S0 is a type-flaw resis-
tant protocol and (S0; 0) w=⇒•∗ (S;A) then both S and A are type-flaw resistant.
Moreover, if A′ ∈ tr(A) then A′ is also type-flaw resistant.
5.3 The Typing Result
All that remains is to prove the actual typing result for stateful protocols. We use
here the Isabelle-formalized typing result of [19] to obtain well-typed models of
ordinary constraints. This result has already been extended to support equalities
t
.
= t′ and inequalities ∀x¯. t 6 .= t′ in strands and constraints, and to support the
Ana theories that we use in this paper. The formalization is available at:
https://people.compute.dtu.dk/samo/typing-soundness/ (*)
Thus we get from Theorem 4 of (*) the following result (note that their the-
orem is on the level of protocol transition systems, i.e., on constraints reachable
in a symbolic protocol transition system =⇒•, but that this can easily be used
to prove a result on constraints A since ({dual(A)}; 0) =⇒•∗ (∅;A)):
Theorem 3 (Typing result on ordinary symbolic constraints). If A is
well-formed and ordinary, I |= A, and A is type-flaw resistant, then there exists
a well-typed interpretation Iτ such that Iτ |= A.
By using our reduction tr together with Theorem 3 on ordinary constraints
we can prove the following:
Theorem 4 (Typing result on symbolic constraints). If A is well-formed,
I |= A, and A is type-flaw resistant, then there exists a well-typed interpretation
Iτ such that Iτ |= A.
Proof. From Theorem 2, Lemma 4(1), and the assumptions we can obtain a type-
flaw resistant ordinary constraint A′ such that A′ ∈ tr(A) and I |= A. Hence,
we can obtain a well-typed interpretation Iτ such that Iτ |= A′ by Theorem 3.
By applying Theorem 2 again we can conclude the proof. uunionsq
With this intermediate result we can prove our main theorem:
Theorem 5 (Typing result for stateful protocols). If S0 is a type-flaw re-
sistant protocol, and (S0; ∅, ∅, ∅) w=⇒∗ (S;M,D,E) where w = (σ1, `1), . . . , (σk, `k)
then there exists a state (S;M ′, D′, E′) such that (S0; ∅, ∅, ∅) w
′
=⇒∗ (S;M ′, D′, E′)
where w′ = (σ′1, `1), . . . , (σ′k, `k) for some well-typed ground substitutions σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
k.
Proof. By using the equivalence between the ground and the symbolic transition
system (Theorem 1) we need only to show that reachable constraints in the
symbolic transition system have well-typed models. Since reachable constraints
for type-flaw resistant protocols are also type-flaw resistant (Lemma 4(2)) we
need only to apply Theorem 4 to the reachable constraints. Thus we obtain the
desired result. uunionsq
Declarations:
ik : pred (untyped)
X,n : nonce
Y : f(nonce)




ik(Y ). ¬∃X : Y = f(X)⇒ attack()
Horn clauses:
∀X : ik(X)→ ik(f(X))
Fig. 1. A flawed TASLan specification.
5.4 A Mistake in a Related Work
Typing for stateful systems has also been considered in [26]; some of its theorems
have only proof sketches. Rigorously formalizing however the lazy intruder and
the typing result (parts of which are now formalized in Isabelle), we have discov-
ered several significant mistakes and we can demonstrate with counter-examples,
that the result of [26] does not hold in this generality as we explain in detail
now.
[26] allows a quite general specification of the intruder by a set of Horn
clauses. There are restrictions of the form of these Horn clauses [26, Sec. 2.1]:
each clause expresses either that the intruder can generate new terms by applying
a function symbol to known terms (this corresponds to public function symbols
in our work) or how the intruder can analyze terms, somewhat corresponding to
our specification of Ana. For that, the requirement on the term obtained by the
analysis is only that it must be a proper subterm of the term being analyzed.
This allows for instance for the following Horn clause (where the predicate ik
represents messages known by the intruder):
ik(f(g(x))→ ik(x)
Suppose now f is a public function and the intruder knows g(s) for a secret s.
Then he can with the above rule apply f to g(s) to obtain s. Such a step is
however not covered by the constraint reduction procedure in [26], since analysis
steps can only be applied to terms that the intruder directly knows, not ones
he has to first compose. Now this leads to a counter-example for the typing
result if we assume that f is not a public symbol, but there is an honest strand
receive(x).send(f(x)) with variable x an atomic type, say, nonce. If the intruder
knows g(s) and s is a secret, then there is an ill-typed attack with x = g(s), but
no well-typed attack.
There is a second problem that there is no restriction on the type of univer-
sally quantified variables in [26]. Indeed composed-typed variables can also break
the typing result as we have shown before. For instance, consider the inequality
∀x. y 6 .= f(x) where Γ (y) = f(Γ (x)). For any instance f(c) of y there is an in-
stance of x (namely c) that does not satisfy the inequality. Hence the constraint
has no well-typed solution. However, there does exist ill-typed solutions; since we
are working in the free algebra terms are equal iff they are syntactically equal,
and hence any instance of x that are not of the form f(c) for some c would be
a solution to the inequality. The ASLan specification in Figure 1 demonstrates
this issue. Here the attack predicate cannot be derived if Y is instantiated with
a well-typed instance in the transition rule.
It turns out that the result from the present paper is sufficient to fix the
mistakes of [26] by applying the same restrictions on the intruder deduction and
on composed-typed variables. A fixed version of [26], highlighting the changes,
is available at https://people.compute.dtu.dk/samo/taslanv3.pdf .
6 Case Studies
In this section we discuss how our typing result is applicable in practice on several
protocols, in particular that many protocols already satisfy the requirements of
type-flaw resistance or require only minor changes to do so.
Due to lack of space we will only consider an extension of the keyserver
example here. In the extended version [21] we also consider the examples from
the AIF and AIF-ω tools (some of those examples have similarly been considered
in SAPIC, in particular PKCS#11 and ASW, but in a way that violates the
corresponding type flaw-resistance requirements).
6.1 Automatically Checking Type-Flaw Resistance
One crucial point of the typing result is that it is relatively easy to check, namely
by statically looking at the format of messages rather than traversing the entire
state space, and that this can also be done automatically as a static analysis of
a user’s specification before verification in a typed model.
Note that SMP(M) is in general infinite, but it is sufficient to check the fol-
lowing finite representation SMP0 for type-flaw resistance: starting with SMP0 =
M , we first ensure that for every message t ∈ SMP0 that contains a variable x of a
composed type f(τ1, . . . , τn), we ensure that also [x 7→ f(x1, . . . , xn)](t) ∈ SMP0
for some variables x1 : τ1, . . . , xn : τn that do not occur in t. (Even if some τi
are themselves composed types, this can be done by adding finitely many mes-
sages, since all type expressions are finite terms.) Next, we close SMP0 under
subterms and key terms of Ana. Finally, let us ensure by well-typed α-renaming
that all terms in SMP0 have pairwise disjoint variables. Note that SMP0 is a
representation of SMP(M) in the sense that every SMP(M) term is a well-typed
instance of an SMP0 term. Now the condition that every pair s, t ∈ SMP0 \ V
with Γ (s) 6= Γ (t) has no unifier, is equivalent to the type-flaw resistance of M .
Proof sketch: Note that SMP0 ⊆ SMP(M), giving us one direction of the equiv-
alence. For the other direction, suppose there are any s, t ∈ SMP(M) \ V such
that Γ (s) 6= Γ (t). We need to show that s and t are not unifiable. Since SMP0
represents SMP(M), there exists terms s0, t0 ∈ SMP0 and well-typed substitu-
tions θ1 and θ2 such that s = θ1(s0) and t = θ2(t0). Hence also Γ (s0) 6= Γ (t0),
and so s0 and t0 are not unifiable by assumption. Thus s and t cannot be unified
as well because s0 and t0 do not share variables.
Note that for protocols with an infinite number of strands the initial set
M should be chosen carefully to prevent an infinite SMP0. In our keyserver
example, for instance, we can choose for M a more general and finite set where
all terms and set operations of the protocol are well-typed instances of terms in
M—such as in the type-flaw resistance example of section 5.2. This is sufficient
to ensure finiteness of SMP0.
6.2 Extension of the Keyserver Example
We will now illustrate by a small example how type-flaw problems can arise in
practice, how type-flaw resistance is violated in such a case, and how the situation
can be fixed. Suppose for the key server example, we augment the protocol with
an exchange where a user can prove to be alive, formalized by having for each
user u and each session j ∈ N the following transaction strand:
receive(Nj).PK u,j ∈˙ ring(u).send(sign(inv(PK u,j), Nj))
where all Nj and PK u,j have atomic types. The idea is that anybody can send
the user a challenge Nj , and u answers with a signature on it. In this blunt form
it is obviously a bad idea, since an intruder can send an arbitrary term instead of
Nj . Indeed the protocol now violates type-flaw resistance: sign(inv(PK u,j), Nj)
has a unifier with the normal update message sign(inv(PK i), 〈Ui,NPK i〉), while
they have different types. The general recommendation is thus to use some form
of tag to indicate what the messages should mean. In fact, many protocol stan-
dards already describe a concrete message format, e.g., in this case that nonces
and public keys have certain byte lengths, or even fields that indicate the length,
if it is not fixed; in contrast many protocol models model only abstractly the
exchanged information as tuples. It is thus recommended to model the concrete
message formats by transparent functions, i.e., functions like pair that the in-
truder can compose and decompose, and check that the concrete formats of the
protocol standard are disjoint so that a confusion is impossible. In this case we
may have functions update(U,PK ) that is used in the update message and func-
tions challenge(N) and response(N) to model the challenge response protocol to
have rather the following form:
receive(challenge(Nj)).PK u,j ∈˙ ring(u).send(sign(inv(PK u,j), response(Nj)))
One may argue that the formatting of the challenge message is irrelevant since
it is in cleartext. We suggest, however, to use formatting information also here,
since it is in fact good practice for implementations anyway and does not really
hurt.
With the change we now have again type-flaw resistance and our typing result
is applicable.
7 Connections to Other Formalisms
We have introduced the formalism of transaction strands to have a simple and
mathematically pure formalism as a protocol model for our result without the
disturbance of the many technical details of various protocol models. We want
to illustrate now that our result can nonetheless be used in various protocol
models, but we only sketch the main ideas and discuss also limitations of our
typing results.
Note that the core of our result is proved on symbolic constraints (intruder
strands) of a symbolic transition system. Connecting another formalism with our
typing result requires only two aspects. First, one needs to define the semantics
for the formalism in terms of a symbolic transition system with constraints (in-
cluding set operations, equalities, and inequalities). Second, one needs to transfer
the notion of type-flaw resistance, so that a type-flaw resistant specification in
the formalism will only produce type-flaw resistant constraints. We have done
this for transaction strands with detailed proofs. Due to the variety of other
formalisms and their technical details, we only sketch in the following the ideas
for the most common constructions.
AIF-ω and Rewriting Our transaction strands are in some sense a purified
version of AIF-ω. In a nutshell, it describes protocols by a set of rewrite rules for
a state transition system, where each state is a set of facts like ik(m) to denote
that the intruder knows message m. It is thus also similar to other rewriting
based languages like Maude-NPA or the AVANTSSAR ASLan.
One can translate each AIF-ω rule into transaction strands as follows. Every
intruder knowledge fact ik(m) on the left hand side of a rule corresponds to
receiving a message m, and on the right hand side to sending a message m. If
the expression t in s occurs on the left-hand side, then the transaction strand
must contain t ∈˙ s; if the same expression does not occur on the right-hand side,
then the transaction must include delete(t, s). If the expression t notin s occurs
on the left-hand side, then the transaction must contain ∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s where x¯ are
the variables that on the left-hand side only occur in notin expressions. Finally,
if t in s occurs on the right-hand side but not on the left, then the transaction
must include insert(t, s). All other facts of AIF-ω are persistent (i.e., once true,
they remain true in all successor states), therefore we can model them as events
in transaction strands, using event(e) for the left-hand side facts and assert(e) for
right-hand side facts. Note that the order of all these actions in the transaction
matters: first we should have all receiving messages, checking for events and set
memberships, then modifying sets and sending the outgoing messages. Still one
may wonder what happens in the following AIF-ω rule: x in s.y in s⇒ x in s. If
x = y then this rule is contradictory, and the semantics of AIF-ω excludes such
substitutions. For that reason, we also have to include the inequality x 6= y to
the transaction to exactly follow the AIF-ω semantics. In all remaining cases the
inner order of the actions is actually irrelevant, but these subtle points were one
of the motivations to introduce transaction strands. Finally, note that the rules
from AIF-ω may have variables that represent any value from a countable set of
constants, as well as the creation of fresh values. Since transaction strands do not
have a mechanism for creating fresh values and free variables are not allowed,
one must instantiate these variables appropriately, producing a countable set of
transaction strands from finitely many rules.
With this translation from AIF-ω rules to transaction strands, we also di-
rectly obtain a semantics using symbolic constraints and actually immediately
transfer the notion of type-flaw resistance from transaction strands with the ob-
vious adaptations. However, type-flaw resistance will not be directly satisfied for
typical AIF-ω specifications immediately, because they would contain rules for
the intruder that contain untyped variables. While for honest agents, it is not
a restriction to declare the intended type for each variable, the intruder deduc-
tion rules should be applicable to messages of any type. Thus, we have to make
the reservation that the intruder deduction of an AIF-ω specification must be
within the bounds of the intruder model we have used here, namely composi-
tion with public functions and decomposition according to an Ana theory. This
is indeed possible for all the standard operators like symmetric and asymmet-
ric encryption, signatures, hashes, and transparent functions like pair; operators
that require algebraic equations like xor are however not supported. We come
back to this when discussing process calculi and reduction rules below.
Finally, note that other rewriting based formalisms like Maude-NPA (or the
closely related linear logic rules) are not based on sets, but usually multi-sets
of facts, and they are not persistent, i.e., facts can be removed by transitions,
which cannot directly be modeled by our notion of events in transaction strands.
There is however a way to encode this using sets: for each fact where we want
to encode non-persistent behavior, we introduce a corresponding event with one
more argument. For this argument we use a fresh constant whenever a fact is
introduced by a transition and the argument becomes member of a special set
active. Whenever the fact shall be removed, we simply remove the corresponding
constant from the set active. This allows for modeling both the multi-set aspect
as well as the non-persistent aspect.
Set-pi and Process Calculi Process calculi are a very popular way of specify-
ing protocols. While they can immediately describe stateful systems (due to Tur-
ing completeness), this is usually not at a level that directly works with existing
verification methods so well. Therefore several extensions have been proposed,
namely Set-pi for set operations similar to AIF-ω, and SAPIC for adding a notion
of maps. One gap to the rewriting formalisms above is that process calculi do
not have the notion of an atomic transaction. Therefore both Set-pi and SAPIC
rely on the use of locks, i.e., in order to read and write on a set or (an element
of) a map, one has to first lock it, and no other process can get a lock on the
same item before it is unlocked. It is possible to give a translation to transaction
strands, modeling explicitly the locks by an additional set that stores which of
the other sets are locked. However, it is a bit more convenient to directly give a
semantics as a symbolic transition system, i.e., producing symbolic constraints
in each execution.
However, before we can do that, there is another obstacle to overcome: it
is convenient to model in process calculi decryption and checking of messages
explicitly by a let construct and reduction rules. For instance if the public func-
tion crypt represents asymmetric encryption and inv the private function that
maps from public to private keys, for decryption one would introduce a new
operator dcrypt and have the reduction rule dcrypt(crypt(x, y), inv(x)) → y.
Then receiving and decrypting a message for instance would be in(u).let v =
dcrypt(u, inv(k)) in P else Q. Thus process P is executed if the received message
u is indeed encrypted with k (and binding v to the content of that message),
otherwise Q is executed. Note that the destructor dcrypt does not occur as part
of “normal” messages.
Our typing result can only support such destructors if we can express such
decryption operations using an Ana theory. In the example we would have
Ana(crypt(x, y)) = ({inv(x)}, {y}) and we would translate the above example
process into in(u). if (crypt(k, ?v) .= u) then P else Q. Note that here we have ac-
tually made an extension of Set-pi, namely adding the concept of equalities from
transaction strands to the if construct, including that newly introduced variables
on the left-hand side are binding, here v, and we mark this by a question mark
as is standard. This is formally defined by the symbolic semantics below.
Besides destructors, process calculi also commonly use reduction rules for
checks on messages, e.g., verify(sign(inv(x), y), x) → true that can be used to
verify a signature, for instance: in(u). let true = verify(u, k) in P else Q. For this,
we do not need to have a corresponding line in Ana, rather we can model this
directly by an equality: in(u). if sign(inv(k), ?z) .= u then P else Q. With this,
all the standard operators can be supported, except those that require algebraic
equations like xor.
If we now assume Set-pi without let but instead with equations in if, we
can define its semantics as a symbolic transition system as in Figure 2 (using
notation and labels similar to the original ground semantics) where α(P ) is a
fresh renaming of all variables in P that are bound by an in statement, and the
translation ctr(b) of a condition b is defined as follows. Recall that we had used
the notion of binding occurrences also in equations (and logically this can also
be done in set membership checks) and marked the respective occurrence by a
question mark, like ?x = .... Let in the following x¯ be the set of variables of a
condition that are marked with the question mark:
ctr(s
.
= t) = s
.
= t ctr(s 6 .= t) = ∀x¯. s 6 .= t
ctr(t ∈˙ s) = t ∈˙ s ctr(t 6 ∈˙ s) = ∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s
Note that the locking is not checked upon set operations, as this is done
statically in Set-pi. Since in general sets can have terms with variables, we have
formulated the check as inequalities in the LCK rule.
In order to check type-flaw resistance, one now needs to consider the trans-
lation from let-statements into equations (which can be done transparent to the
NIL : P unionmulti {(0, ∅)},A → P,A
COM1 : P unionmulti {(in(x).P1, L1)},A → P unionmulti {(P1, L1)},A.send(x)
COM2 : P unionmulti {(out(N).P2, L2)},A → P unionmulti {(P2, L2)},A.receive(N)
PAR : P unionmulti {(P1 |P2, ∅)},A → P unionmulti {(P1, ∅), (P2, ∅)},A
REPL : P unionmulti {(!P, ∅)},A → P unionmulti {(α(P ) |!P, ∅)}
NEW : P unionmulti {(new x.P, L)},A → P unionmulti {(P [x 7→ c], L)},A
for some fresh name c
IF1 : P unionmulti {(if b thenP1 else P2, L)},A → P unionmulti {(P1, L)},A.ctr(b)
IF2 : P unionmulti {(if b thenP1 else P2, L)},A → P unionmulti {(P2, L)},A.ctr(¬b)
SET+ : P unionmulti {(insert(t, s).P, L)},A → P unionmulti {(P,L)},A.insert(t, s)
SET− : P unionmulti {(delete(t, s).P, L)},A → P unionmulti {(P,L)},A.delete(t, s)
LCK : P unionmulti {(lock(l).P, L)},A → P unionmulti {(P, {l} ∪ L)},A.l 6 .= l1. · · · .l 6 .= ln
where {l1, . . . , ln} = L ∪⋃(P ′,L′)∈P L′
ULCK : P unionmulti {(unlock(l).P, {l} unionmulti L)},A → P unionmulti {(P,L)},A
Fig. 2. A symbolic transition system for Set-pi.
user) and then the type-flaw resistance property is almost as before, only we
need to consider each condition positive and its negation (unless the else case is
empty). Note that sometimes this may lead to violations of type-flaw resistance
when we have variables of composed types, since they are not allowed in inequal-
ities. This is only a problem if two issues arise at the same time though: (1) the
else branch is not empty and (2) the structure of the message is not entirely
discernible to that agent (e.g. if the result of a decryption is an encryption that
the agent does not have the key to). One of the two issues alone can be handled,
however.
SAPIC Finally, let us consider the SAPIC tool that is also a process calculus,
but instead of sets has a global map, i.e., one can insert key-value pairs into the
map (where inserting multiple times with the same key is overwriting), delete
pairs, and query what value is associated to a key.
For a restricted setting, we can indeed express this map with sets, namely if
we can split the map into finitely many partitions where each key and value are
of some atomic type. For instance, in the PKCS examples, the value type are
actually tuples, but the second part ranges over finitely many values and thus
one could represent this maps as a finite collection of maps with atomic value
type.
The idea is of course to model map m = [k1 7→ v1, . . . , kn 7→ vn] by a family
of sets m(·) such that v1 ∈ m(k1), . . . , vn ∈ m(kn). Initially, all maps should
contain one distinguished symbol ⊥ to represent that for that key no value
is in the map. Then to insert the tuple (k, v) translates to the set operations
x ∈˙ m(k).delete(x,m(k)).insert(v,m(k)). To delete key k from the map is then
like inserting (k,⊥). Querying for key k is checking x ∈˙ m(k) and x 6 .= ⊥.
8 Conclusion
Over the past years, several typing results have emerged for security protocols,
gradually extending the class of protocols that can be supported, in particu-
lar [18,2,1,19]. A common idea for proving such typing results is to use a notion
of symbolic constraints to represent executions (in particular attacks) and show
that whenever there is a solution then there is a well-typed one. The requirement
that the protocols have to fulfill for such a result is only that all messages of
different intended type have sufficiently different structure to never be confused.
This is fulfilled by many common protocols like a standard setup of TLS [19].
One relevant trend in protocol security is the support for stateful protocols,
i.e., protocols in which participants can manipulate a global state that is shared
among an unbounded number of sessions. This is for instance relevant to model
security devices like key tokens or servers that maintain a database. There is only
one typing result so far that supports stateful protocols, namely [26]. We point
out several mistakes of this paper in section 5.4, showing that their results do not
hold in this generality. A particular problem are variables of composed types in
negative conditions, which illustrates that typing results for stateful systems are
far more subtle than intuition suggests and rigorous proofs are necessary. Our
main contribution of this paper is to establish the first precise typing result for
a class of stateful protocols—fixing also [26]. Despite a meticulous formalization
it is conceptually still quite simple, as it is based on a reduction to the existing
typing results, in particular the formalization of [19].
Our typing result conservatively extends existing ones, i.e., for stateless pro-
tocols we do not require any further restrictions. The restrictions on set opera-
tions are similar to those on messages, but additionally, we have to limit here the
use of variables of composed types (unless negative operations are not needed
for a set). In fact, the condition of our typing result is satisfied by most exam-
ples distributed with the AIF-ω tool [27], and in the remaining cases a simple
disambiguation of messages is sufficient.
Besides the trend towards the verification of more complex stateful protocols
that this typing result focuses on, there are other crucial trends like the verifi-
cation of privacy-type goals using equivalence properties, and typing results in
this direction have been established [13]. A question for future research is thus
if statefulness and equivalence proofs can be combined. Another closely related
area are compositionality results that can often benefit from typing results, for
instance in [1]. Establishing compositionality for stateful protocols is another
interesting direction for future research.
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A Additional Case-Studies
We want to discuss how our typing result is applicable in practice on several
protocols, in particular that many protocols already satisfy the requirements of
type-flaw resistance or require only minor changes to do so.
As for examples of stateful verification, we consider the examples from the
AIF and AIF-ω tools, since this is the closest match to our formalization, as
discussed in section 7. Note that some of the examples have similarly been con-
sidered in SAPIC, in particular PKCS#11, but in a way that violates the corre-
sponding type flaw-resistance requirements, namely that the types of keys and
values be atomic as discussed in section 7. To satisfy our requirements would not
require a change of the protocol itself, but of the way its storage is modeled, e.g.,
repartitioning maps or use sets in the first place. Thus we discuss these examples
rather on their AIF-ω models where the requirements are met or easily achieved.
A.1 Secure Vehicle Communication
A set of examples for AIF is a model of the secure vehicle communication
of the SEVECOM project [32,28]. These define a setup for hardware secu-
rity modules in cars that store a number of keys that can only be used via
a number of API commands. A main concern is the so-called root key update.
Here we have the following message patterns of incoming and outgoing mes-
sages, where the variables K, K1, and K2 are of type value: K, sign(inv(K),K),
and sign(inv(K2 ), pair(K1 ,K)), where we have omitted some message patterns
that can be obtained by well-typed substitutions. The corresponding set of sub-
message patterns
SMP({K, sign(inv(K),K), sign(inv(K2 ), pair(K1 ,K))})
is the closure of the message patterns under subterms, term decomposition, and
well-typed instantiation.
This is not directly type-flaw resistant: if we first consider a well-typed re-
naming of the first signature, say, sign(inv(K3 ),K3 ) then there is a unifier with
the other signature sign(inv(K2 ), pair(K1 ,K)), namely identifying K3, K2, and
pair(K1 ,K). Indeed the two signature messages here have different type and
meaning (the first means key revocation, the second means key update), while
they have nothing signaling in the signed text which message it is. Indeed, if
we look at the standard [32], it requires that the revocation and the update
signature contain specific text namely “REVOKE ROOT PUBLIC KEY” and
“LOAD ROOT PUBLIC KEY”. This had not been modeled in [28]. Again, we
recommend to use here transparent functions revoke/1 and update/2, to model
the format of the revoke and update messages, respectively, and for which the
intruder can directly extract the arguments, i.e., Ana(revoke(K)) = (∅, {K}) and
Ana(update(K1 ,K2 )) = (∅, {K1 ,K2}). Then we have as SMP the following set
closed under closure under subterms and well-typed substitutions (in this case
study closing under term decomposition is unnecessary as it is subsumed by
closing under subterms):
{K, sign(inv(K), revoke(K)), sign(inv(K2 ), update(K1 ,K))}
and indeed now type-flaw resistance is satisfied.
A.2 PKCS#11
The examples of AIF-ω contains a number of specifications of PKCS#11 based
APIs following [16,10]. Again the model of a crypto-device is here by a number
of transactions that consist of a command and arguments to the device, which
performs some checks, possibly generates some encryptions and makes some
notes and sends an output as a result. The question is if an intruder can obtain
something by combining several API calls in a way that had not been anticipated.
Again, the AIF-ω model of these calls is based on sets for describing the different
flags associated to a key (e.g., whether it is a key that can be extracted). The
specification is again that all elements of the sets are declared to have type
value, thus it only remains to check that the messages input and output to the
device fulfill the type-flaw resistance. Since the commands themselves are not
encrypted, the AIF models do not model opcodes and the like and just present
the bare arguments (e.g. key-handles, encrypted messages etc.) to the device.
We then obtain the following kind of messages:
bind(N,K,K), h(N,K), K, senc(M,K)
Here K, N , and M are of type value, and we have omitted some terms that are
redundant under well-typed substitution again. Also this is type-flaw resistant,
however there is an interesting point. As long as only the intruder is interacting
with the token interface, the type-flaw resistance is guaranteeing that he has
no gain from using ill-typed messages. However, when we consider extensions
of these examples (e.g., a richer API or a network with other tokens or honest
parties), then also more complex messages M in the symmetric encryption may
be produced (or received by honest agents) and the type-flaw resistance breaks.
It therefore seems like a good idea to not have raw encryptions of a key (like in
senc(M,K)) but to insert some more information into the encrypted message,
like a format as in the SEVECOM example above. Indeed this solves some of
the attacks that arise in the use of the API already, when we use different such
formats (or tags) for keys of different intended use (e.g. wrap-unwrap attacks).
A.3 ASW
The fair contract signing protocol ASW is another example of a protocol that
necessarily requires a global state. With AIF shipped a formalization of ASW
that abbreviates some protocol messages drastically, for instance the function
msg1(A,B, contract(A,B), h(NA)) to abbreviate a message from A to B that
is actually signed with the private key of A, and intruder rules that allow the
intruder to compose such a msg1-message if A is dishonest (and always decom-
pose it). To use it with our typing result and the Ana functions, we need to use
a more standard model, explicitly denoting the signature function, i.e., for msg1
we rather have sign(inv(pk(A)),m1(A,B, contract(A,B), h(NA))) where m1 is a
transparent function to model the concrete format of the message content.
Note that when this message is received by B, it has the form
sign(inv(pk(A)),m1(A,B, contract(A,B),HNA))
with a variable HNA of the composed type h(nonce), since B cannot check at
this point that this is indeed a hash of a nonce as it should be. The entire point
of this fair exchange is in fact that the nonces are revealed only later.
The second message has the form sign(inv(pk(B)),m2(B, t, h(NB))) where
t = sign(inv(pk(A)),m1(A,B, contract(A,B),HNA), i.e., the t is a message of the
first form; note that here the variables A and B must all agree in these forms
since this is part of what the participants check. When A receives this message,
it has the form sign(inv(pk(B)),m2(B, t′,HNB)) with a composed-type variable
HNB since A similarly cannot check that this is really a hash of a nonce. In
contrast t′ has the form sign(inv(pk(A)),m1(A,B, contract(A,B), h(NA))) since
here the nonce NA has been created by A herself earlier.
Messages three and four of the protocol are simply the nonces NA and NB ;
even though we suggest not to have such raw data sent around (and rather wrap
it in another transparent format), this is not a problem with type-flaw resistance.
Note that for that part of the verification we have now the equations HNA =
h(NA) and HNB = h(NB) since after receiving the nonce from each other, the
agents should check out with the respective HNA and HNB received earlier. Note
also that if there was a continuation for the case that such a check fails, it could
not be handled by our typing result, because that would imply composed-typed
variables in inequalities.
The most interesting part of ASW is the communication with a server in case
the above four-step contract signing goes wrong, i.e., if one of the agents does not
receive an answer anymore, in particular if B has received message three from A
and thus has a valid contract, and dishonestly refuses to reveal the final message
four to A, so A does not have a contract. The protocol assumes that both agents
have resilient channels to a trusted third party, i.e., they eventually get an an-
swer. If A did not receive an answer to her message one, she can send an abort
message to the server of the form sign(inv(pk(A)), abortReq(t)) where t is the first
message she had sent. If A or B at a later point in the protocol (i.e., after at
least sending/receiving message two) do not obtain an answer, they can ask for
a resolve, which is of the form sign(inv(pk(X)), resolveReg(t1, t2)) where t1 and
t2 are the first two messages of the protocol and X is the agent A or B asking for
the resolve. The server should now look in his database of contracts, and if the
contract does not occur in the database yet, grant the abort or resolve request, by
the messages sign(inv(pk(s)), abort(t)) or sign(inv(pk(s)), resolve(t1, t2)), respec-
tively, where inv(pk(s)) is the private key of the server. The result is of course
also stored in the database, and this entry will be the reply to any agent who
asks for an abort or resolve of that contract.
The AIF model has here several limitations: since resilient channels cannot be
modeled directly, it models the interaction between users and servers as atomic
transitions. The assumption of the real protocol is a bit weaker: an intruder
cannot entirely block a request or the response, but he may be able to delay it,
for instance observe a request and send a different request that arrives earlier at
the server. Also the messages exchanged are not modeled, but only the effects on
the users and servers database. We have thus here checked type-flaw resistance
both for the restricted model that comes with AIF and for an extended model
that includes all necessary steps and possible interleavings.
The database of the server is actually modeled as a family of sets scondb(A,B,Status)
for each agent A, B and Status is either valid or aborted. However, instead of
the contract, it stores only the nonce NA. This is due to AIF’s limitations to
sets of constants. It is sufficient to make a working model of ASW, since NA is
sufficient to identify the concrete exchange.
In fact, satisfaction of the type-flaw resistance is easy to see, since every
function symbol except sign is applied in all messages to terms of the same
types and the message being signed is never directly a variable. Similar, for
the sets, the contents have all type nonce, and the set terms have the form
family(A,B,Status) where A and B are agents and Status ranges over a set of
possible status messages.
B Proofs
This appendix contains the pen-and-paper proofs of our technical results. Note
that many of the theorems and lemmas are more general versions of the ones
found in the paper. For the proofs we make use the following definition of substi-
tution composition: Given substitutions δ and σ the composition δ · σ is defined
as the substitution λx. σ(δ(x)).
B.1 Constraint Semantics
Lemma 1. Given a ground set of terms M , a ground database mapping D, a
ground set E of asserted events, an interpretation I, and symbolic constraints
A and A′, the following holds:
I |=M,D,E A.A′ if and only if (I |=M,D,E A and
I |=M∪ik(I(A)),db(insert(D).I(A)),E∪ev(I(A)) A′)
Proof. Each direction of the biconditional follows easily by an induction on the
leftmost constraint A. uunionsq
Lemma 2. Given a ground state (S;M,D,E), a transaction strand ` ∈ S (con-
dition C1), and a ground substitution σ with domain fv(`) (condition C2), then
the conditions C3 to C9 hold if and only if σ |=M,D,E dual(`).
Proof. Let ` = receive(T ).S.send(T ′) where S does not contain send and receive
steps and observe that dual(`) = send(T ).dual(S).receive(T ′). Condition C3 then
corresponds to σ |=M,D,E send(T ), condition C4 to C9 to σ |=M,D,E dual(S),
and the remaining part receive(T ′) is irrelevant as it is satisfied for any M , D,
E, and σ. Thus C3 to C9 hold if and only if σ |=M,D,E dual(`). uunionsq
B.2 Transition Systems
Lemma 3 (Well-formedness of reachable symbolic constraints). If S0 is
a well-formed protocol and (S0; 0) w=⇒•∗ (S;A) then A is a well-formed symbolic
constraint and S is a well-formed protocol.
Proof. By induction on reachability. The base case (i.e., the symmetric case)
is trivial. For the inductive case assume that (S0; 0) w
′
=⇒•∗ (S;A) `=⇒• (S \
{`};A.A′) where A and S are well-formed by the induction hypothesis. Let ` =
receive(T ).S.send(T ′), where S does not contain further receive and send steps,
then A′ = dual(`) = send(T ).S.receive(T ′) by definition. Since S \ {`} ⊆ S and
S is well-formed we have that S \{`} must also be well-formed. Since all strands
in S0 are variable-disjoint we also have that fv(A) ∩ fv(A′) = ∅. Hence A.A′
is well-formed if A is well-formed and A′ is well-formed. The prefix A is well-
formed by the induction hypothesis, and since ` ∈ S we know that dual(`) = A′
is well-formed as well. Thus we can conclude the case. uunionsq
Theorem 1 (Equivalence of transition systems). Let S0 be a protocol and
let {`1, . . . , `k} ⊆ S0. Then:
1. If (S0; ∅, ∅, ∅) w=⇒∗ (S;M,D,E) where w = (σ1, `1), . . . , (σk, `k) then
(a) (S0; 0) w
′
=⇒•∗ (S; dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k)) where w′ = `1, . . . , `k,
(b) σ1 · . . . · σk |= dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k),
(c) M = ik((σ1 · . . . · σk)(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))),
(d) D = db((σ1 · . . . · σk)(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))), and
(e) E = ev((σ1 · . . . · σk)(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))).
2. If (S0; 0) w=⇒•∗ (S;A) and I |= A where w = `1, . . . , `k, dom(I) = fv(A),
and I is ground, then there exists substitutions σ1, . . . , σk such that
(a) (S0; ∅, ∅, ∅) w
′
=⇒∗ (S; ik(I(A)), db(I(A)), ev(I(A)))
where w′ = (σ1, `1), . . . , (σk, `k),
(b) A = dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k),
(c) dom(σi) = fv(`i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and
(d) I = σ1 · . . . · σk
Proof. 1. We prove the first implication by an induction on reachability.
The base case (i.e. the symmetric case) follows easily from the assumptions.
So, in the inductive case, assume that
(S0; ∅, ∅, ∅) w=⇒∗ (S;M,D,E)
wk+1
=⇒ (S \ {`k+1};M ∪ σk+1(T ′),
db(insert(D).σk+1(S)),
E ∪ ev(σk+1(S)))
where `k+1 = receive(T ).S.send(T ′) ∈ S and w = (σ1, `1), . . . , (σk, `k) and
wk+1 = (σk+1, `k+1). We furthermore assume the induction hypothesis:
(H1) (S0; 0) w
′
=⇒•∗ (S; dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k)) where w′ = `1, . . . , `k,
(H2) σ1 · . . . · σk |= dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k),
(H3) M = ik((σ1 · . . . · σk)(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))),
(H4) D = db((σ1 · . . . · σk)(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))), and
(H5) E = ev((σ1 · . . . · σk)(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))).
In the remaining proof for this case we will use the abbreviations I = σ1 ·
. . . · σk+1 and A = dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k+1). We will now prove each of the
five parts of the thesis for this case:
– From (H1) and `k+1 ∈ S we can apply `k+1=⇒• and immediately conclude
part (a) of the thesis, namely (S0; 0) w
′,`k+1
=⇒•∗ (S \ {`k+1};A).
– From the assumption and Lemma 2 we know that σk+1 |=M,D,E dual(`k+1)
and since all strands of a protocol must be pairwise variable-disjoint we
furthermore know that (σ1 · . . . · σk)(dual(`k+1)) = dual(`k+1). Hence
I |=M,D,E dual(`k+1) because dom(σi) ∩ dom(σj) = ∅ for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . , k+1} where i 6= j since dom(σi) = fv(`i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k+1}.
Likewise, we get I |= dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k) from (H2). All together we
can then conclude part (b), namely I |= A.
– Note that dual(receive(T ).S.send(T ′)) = send(T ).dual(S).receive(T ′) and
so ik(dual(`k+1)) = T ′. Together with the variable disjointedness of the
strands and (H3) we have:
M ∪ σk+1(T ′)
= ik((σ1 · . . . · σk)(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))) ∪ σk+1(T ′)
= ik(I(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))) ∪ I(T ′)
= ik(I(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))) ∪ ik(I(dual(`k+1)))
= ik(I(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k).dual(`k+1)))
which proves the third part of the case.
– Note that dual(S) = S and therefore db(σk+1(S)) = db(σk+1(dual(`k+1))).
Together with the variable disjointedness and (H4) we then have:
db(insert(D).σk+1(S))
= db(insert(D).I(dual(`k+1)))
= db(insert(db(I(dual(`1). · · · .
dual(`k)))).I(dual(`k+1)))
= db(I(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k).dual(`k+1)))
which proves the fourth part of the case.
– The fifth and final part of the case is proven similarly to the third part
and using (H5):
E ∪ σk+1(ev(S))
= ev((σ1 · . . . · σk)(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k)))
∪ σk+1(ev(S))
= ev(I(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k))) ∪ I(ev(S))
= ev(I(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k)))
∪ ev(I(dual(`k+1)))
= ev(I(dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k).dual(`k+1)))
Thus we have proven all parts of the thesis for the inductive case.
2. We also prove the second implication by an induction on reachability. Again,
the base case is trivial.
For the inductive case we assume that
(S0; 0) w=⇒•∗ (S;A)
`k+1
=⇒• (S \ {`k+1};A.dual(`k+1))
and I |= A.dual(`k+1) where w = `1, . . . , `k, dom(I) = fv(A.dual(`k+1)),
and I is ground. Now obtain the unique σk+1 and I ′ such that dom(σk+1) =
fv(dual(`k+1)), dom(I ′) = fv(A), and I = I ′ · σk+1. This is always possible
since the domain of I is exactly the free variables of A.dual(`k+1) and I
is ground and since all strands of S0 are pairwise-variable disjoint. Hence
we have that I ′ |= A and σk+1 |=ik(I′(A)),db(I′(A)),ev(I′(A)) dual(`k+1), the
former of which is the premise to the induction hypotheses for this case, and
we can therefore apply the induction hypotheses to get
(H1) (S0; ∅, ∅) w
′
=⇒∗ (S; ik(I ′(A)), db(I ′(A)), ev(I ′(A)))
where w′ = (σ1, `1), . . . , (σk, `k),
(H2) A = dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k),
(H3) dom(σi) = fv(`i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and
(H4) I ′ = σ1 · . . . · σk
This basically lets us immediately prove the second, third, and fourth part
of the thesis for this case, namely
– A.dual(`k+1) = dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k).dual(`k+1),
– dom(σi) = fv(`i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, and
– I = σ1 · . . . · σk · σk+1
All that remains to be proven is
(S0; ∅, ∅) w
′′
=⇒∗ (S \ {`k+1}; ik(I(A.dual(`k+1))),
db(I(A.dual(`k+1))),
ev(I(A.dual(`k+1))))
where w′′ = w′, (σk+1, `k+1).
From the first induction hypothesis (H1), Lemma 2, and σk+1 |=ik(I′(A)),db(I′(A)),ev(I′(A))
dual(`k+1) we can apply
(σk+1,`k+1)
=⇒ to get
(S0; ∅, ∅) w
′′
=⇒∗ (S \ {`k+1}; ik(I ′(A)) ∪ σk+1(T ′),
db(insert(db(I ′(A))).σk+1(S)),
ev(I ′(A)) ∪ ev(σk+1(S)))
where `k+1 = receive(T ).S.send(T ′). Hence we only need to prove that
– ik(I ′(A)) ∪ σk+1(T ′) = ik(I(A.dual(`k+1))),
– db(insert(db(I ′(A))).σk+1(S)) =
db(I(A.dual(`k+1))), and
– ev(I ′(A)) ∪ σk+1(S) = ev(I(A.dual(`k+1)))
and this is proven similarly to how we proved the third to fifth part of the
previous case. Thus we have proven all four conjuncts—(a), (b), (c), and
(d)—of the conclusion for this inductive case.
uunionsq
B.3 Constraint Reduction
We prove Theorem 2 in two steps. First we prove that the translation preserves
well-formedness. Secondly we prove the semantic equivalence.
Theorem 2(2) (Well-formedness of translation). Let X be a set of vari-
ables, D be a database mapping, and E be a finite set of events such that
fv(D)∪fv(E) ⊆ X. If A is well-formed w.r.t. the variables X and A′ ∈ trD,E(A)
then A′ is well-formed w.r.t. X.
Proof. We prove the statement by an induction on trD,E(A):
– Case trD,E(0): Trivially true by definition of well-formedness.
– Cases trD,E(send(t).A), trD,E(receive(t).A), trD,E(t .= t′.A), and trD,E((∀x¯. t 6 .=
t′).A): Follows easily from the induction hypotheses.
– Case trD,E(insert(t, s).A): From the premises we have that fv(t)∪ fv(s) ⊆ X
because insert(t, s).A is well-formed w.r.t. X. Hence A is well-formed w.r.t.
X and fv(D∪{(t, s)}) = fv(D) ⊆ X as well. Thus we can apply the induction
hypothesis to A′ ∈ trD∪{(t,s)},E(A) and conclude the case.
– Case trD,E(delete(t, s).A): Note that fv(D\{d1, . . . , di})) ⊆ fv(D) ⊆ X. The
remaining part of this case now follows from a similar argument to the one
given in the previous case.
– Case trD,E(t ∈˙ s.A): By the premises we have that A is well-formed w.r.t.
X ∪ fv(t) ∪ fv(s). From the induction hypothesis we then have that A′ ∈
trD,E(A) is also well-formed w.r.t. X ∪ fv(t) ∪ fv(s). Thus (t, s) .= d.A′ is
well-formed w.r.t. X.
– Case trD,E((∀y¯. t 6 ∈˙ s).A): The constraints ∀y¯. t 6 ∈˙ s and (∀y¯. (t, s) 6 .=
d1). · · · .(∀y¯. (t, s) 6 .= dn) have the same well-formedness requirement. Thus
the case follows straightforwardly from the induction hypothesis.
– Case trD,E(event(t).A): This case is similar to the trD,E(t ∈˙ s.A) case.
– Case trD,E((∀y¯. ¬event(t)).A): This case is similar to the trD,E((∀y¯. t 6 ∈˙
s).A) case.
uunionsq
Theorem 2(1) (Semantic equivalence of constraints and their transla-
tion). Assume fv(D)∪ fv(E) to be disjoint from the bound variables of A. Then
I |=M,I(D),I(E) A iff there exists A′ ∈ trD,E(A) such that I |=M,∅,∅ A′.
Proof. Consider the following two statements which together are equivalent to
the original biconditional:
1. If I |=M,I(D),I(E) A then there exists A′ ∈ trD,E(A) such that I |=M,∅,∅ A′.
2. If A′ ∈ trD,E(A) and I |=M,∅,∅ A′ then I |=M,I(D),I(E) A.
We prove the first of these implications by an induction on A:
– Case 0: Trivially true.
– Cases send(t).A, receive(t).A, t .= t′.A, and (∀x¯. t 6 .= t′).A: Follows straight-
forwardly from the induction hypotheses.
– Case insert(t, s).A: So I |=M,I(D)∪{I((t,s))},I(E) A. Since I(D)∪{I((t, s))} =
I(D ∪ {(t, s)}) we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain A′ where
A′ ∈ trD∪{(t,s)},E(A) and I |=M,∅,∅ A′. Thus A′ ∈ trD,E(insert(t, s).A) and
I |=M,∅,∅ A′.
– Case delete(t, s).A: Hence I |=M,I(D)\{I((t,s))},I(E) A. Now partition D into
the sets {d1, . . . , di} and {di+1, . . . , dn} for some 0 ≤ i ≤ n such that
I({(t, s)}) = I({d1, . . . , di}) and I((t, s)) /∈ I({di+1, . . . , dn}). Then
I(D) \ I({(t, s)})
= I(D) \ I({d1, . . . , di})
= I({di+1, . . . , dn})
= I(D \ {d1, . . . , di})
We can then apply the induction hypothesis to obtainA′ ∈ trD\{d1,...,di},E(A)
such that I |=M,∅,∅ A′. Now let B = (t, s) .= d1. · · · .(t, s) .= di.(t, s) 6 .=
di+1. · · · .(t, s) 6 .= dn. Then we have that B.A′ ∈ trD,E(A) and I |=M,∅,∅ B.A′
which concludes the case.
– Case t ∈˙ s.A: Hence, by the premises of this case, I |=M,I(D),I(E) A where
I((t, s)) ∈ I(D). So by the induction hypothesis we can obtain A′ such that
A′ ∈ trD,E(A) and I |=M,∅,∅ A′. Because I((t, s)) ∈ I(D) it must be the
case that there exists some d ∈ D such that I((t, s)) = I(d). Thus we can




– Case (∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s).A: Hence I(δ((t, s))) /∈ I(D) for all ground substitu-
tions δ with domain x¯. Hence I(δ((t, s))) 6= I(d) for all d ∈ D and all
δ with domain x¯. Since x¯ ∩ fv(D) = ∅ we have that δ(D) = D. Hence
I(δ((t, s))) 6= I(δ(d)) for all d ∈ D and all δ with domain x¯. Therefore
I |=M,∅,∅ (∀x¯. (t, s) 6 .= d1). · · · .(∀x¯. (t, s) 6 .= dn), where D = {d1, . . . , dn}, by
definition of the constraint semantics. Thus the case follows by the induction
hypothesis.
– The cases assert(t).A, event(t).A, and (∀x¯. ¬event(t)).A are proven similarly
to the cases insert(t, s).A, t ∈˙ s.A, and (∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s).A respectively.
The other implication is also proven by an induction on A:
– Case 0: Trivially true.
– Cases send(t).A, receive(t).A, t .= t′.A, and (∀x¯. t 6 .= t′).A: Follows straight-
forwardly from the induction hypotheses.
– Case insert(t, s).A: Hence A′ ∈ trD∪{(t,s)},E(A). Since we already have that
I |=M,∅,∅ A′ from the premises we can now apply the induction hypothesis
to get that I |=M,I(D∪{(t,s)}),I(E) A. Since also I(D ∪ {(t, s)}) = I(D) ∪
{I((t, s))} it follows that I |=M,I(D),I(E) insert(t, s).A.
– Case delete(t, s).A: Hence A′ = B.A′′ for some d1, . . . , dn, i, n, B, and A′′
where
• 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
• D = {d1, . . . , di . . . , dn},
• B = (t, s) .= d1. · · · .(t, s) .= di.(t, s) 6 .= di+1. · · · .(t, s) 6 .= dn, and
• A′′ ∈ trD\{d1,...,di},E(A).
We also have that I |=M,∅,∅ A′′ and I |=M,∅,∅ B because I |=M,∅,∅ A′. Note
that I(D\{d1, . . . , di}) = I(D)\{I((t, s))} because I((s, t)) /∈ I({di+1, . . . , dn})
and {I((t, s))} = I({d1, . . . , di}). Thus, we can apply the induction hypoth-
esis and conclude that I |=M,I(D),I(E) delete(t, s).A.
– Case t ∈˙ s.A: Hence A′ = (t, s) .= d.A′′ for some d ∈ D and A′′ ∈ trD,E(A),
and together with the premises we then have that I((t, s)) = I(d) and
I |=M,I(D),I(E) A′′. We can now apply the induction hypothesis to get
I |=M,I(D),I(E) A. Since d ∈ D and I((t, s)) = I(d) we also have that
I((t, s)) is in I(D). Thus we can conclude I |=M,I(D),I(E) t ∈˙ s.A.
– Case (∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s).A: Hence A′ = (∀x¯. (t, s) 6 .= d1). · · · .(∀x¯. (t, s) 6 .= dn).A′′
for some A′′ ∈ trD,E(A) and D = {d1, . . . , dn}. Hence, using the premises,
we know that I(δ((t, s))) 6= I(δ(di)) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all ground
δ with domain x¯. Hence I(δ((t, s))) /∈ I(D) for all ground δ with domain
x¯ because x¯ and the free variables of D are disjoint. Since we also have
I |=M,∅,∅ A′′ from the premises we can apply the induction hypothesis to get
I |=M,I(D),I(E) A, and thus we can conclude I |=M,I(D),I(E) (∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s)A.
– The cases assert(t).A, event(t).A, and (∀x¯. ¬event(t)).A are proven similarly
to the cases insert(t, s).A, t ∈˙ s.A, and (∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s).A respectively.
uunionsq
B.4 The Typing Result
For our typing result we use the results of [19]. This result has been extended to
support equalities t .= t′ and inequalities ∀x¯. t 6 .= t′ in strands and constraints,
and to support the Ana theories that we use in this paper. Thus we get from
Theorem 4 of [19] the following result (note that this theorem is on the level of
protocol transition systems, i.e., on constraints reachable in a symbolic protocol
transition system =⇒•, but that this can easily be used to prove a result on
constraints A since ({dual(A)}; 0) =⇒•∗ (∅;A)):
Theorem 3 (Typing result on ordinary symbolic constraints). If A is
well-formed and ordinary, I |= A, and A is type-flaw resistant, then there exists
a well-typed interpretation Iτ such that Iτ |= A.
The remaining section contains the proof of our typing results and related
lemmas.
Lemma 4 (Type-flaw resistance preservation).
1. If A is type-flaw resistant, well-formed, and A′ ∈ tr(A), then A′ is type-flaw
resistant.
2. If S0 is a type-flaw resistant protocol and (S0; 0) w=⇒•∗ (S;A) then both S
and A are type-flaw resistant.
Proof. 1. We first prove that trms(A′)∪ setops(A′) is type-flaw resistant. Note
that trms(A′) \ trms(A) ⊆ setops(A), and that setops(A′) = ∅. Hence
trms(A′)∪ setops(A′) ⊆ trms(A)∪ setops(A). Since trms(A)∪ setops(A) is
by assumption type-flaw resistant it follows that any subset is also type-flaw
resistant. Thus trms(A′) ∪ setops(A′) is type-flaw resistant.
The reduced constraintA′ does not contain set operations, and the remaining
constraint steps of A′ either originate from A or are constructed during the
translation tr(A). Thus it is sufficient in the remaining proof to only consider
those steps which are created during the translation tr(A), and we do so by
a case analysis:
– During translation of a set operation of the form t ∈˙ s the translation
adds one step of the form (t, s) .= (t′, s′) where insert(t′, s′) occurred
somewhere in A. Since both (t, s) and (t′, s′) occur in setops(A), which
is a subset of SMP(A) \ V, they must have the same type if they are
unifiable. Thus type-flaw resistance is satisfied in this case.
– During translation of a set operation delete(t, s) or ∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s the trans-
lation adds new steps of the form (t, s) .= (t′, s′) and ∀x¯. (t, s) 6 .= (t′, s′)
where insert(t′, s′) occurred somewhere in A. As we argued earlier, if
(t, s) and (t′, s′) are unifiable then they have the same type. Hence all
the new equality steps (t, s) .= (t′, s′) are type-flaw resistant. Also, from
type-flaw resistance of A we have that fv(t) ∪ fv(t′) ∪ fv(s) ∪ fv(s′) all
have atomic type. Since all free variables occurring in the new inequality
steps ∀x¯. (t, s) 6 .= (t′, s′) are of atomic type we also have that these steps
are type-flaw resistant.
– During translation of the event step event(e) the translation adds new a
step of the form e .= e′ where assert(e′) occurs in A. We know by type-
flaw resistance of A that e, e′ ∈ SMP(A) \ V and so they must have the
same type if they are unifiable. Thus the new equality steps are type-flaw
resistant.
– During translation of the event step ∀x¯. ¬event(e) the translation adds
a new step of the form ∀x¯. e 6 .= e′ where assert(e′) occurs in A. We know
by type-flaw resistance of A that all variables fv(e)∪ fv(e′) are of atomic
type and so the new inequality steps are type-flaw resistant.
Thus A′ is type-flaw resistant.
2. This follows from the fact thatA = dual(`1). · · · .dual(`k) for some `1, . . . , `k ∈
S0, and since each `i are type-flaw resistant (so each dual(`i) is type-flaw re-
sistant), trms(S0)∪setops(S0) is type-flaw resistant and trms(A)∪setops(A) ⊆
trms(S0)∪setops(S0) (so trms(A)∪setops(A) is type-flaw resistant), we can
conclude that A is type-flaw resistant. uunionsq
Theorem 4 (Typing result on symbolic constraints). If A is well-formed,
I |= A, and A is type-flaw resistant, then there exists a well-typed interpretation
Iτ such that Iτ |= A.
Proof. From Theorem 2, Lemma 4(1), and the assumptions we can obtain a type-
flaw resistant ordinary constraint A′ such that A′ ∈ tr(A) and I |= A′. Hence,
we can obtain a well-typed interpretation Iτ such that Iτ |= A′ by Theorem 3,
and by then applying Theorem 2 again we can conclude the proof. uunionsq
Theorem 5 (Typing result for stateful protocols). If S0 is a type-flaw resis-
tant protocol, and (S0; ∅, ∅, ∅) w=⇒∗ (S;M,D,E) where w = (σ1, `1), . . . , (σk, `k)
then there exists a state (S;M ′, D′, E′) such that (S0; ∅, ∅, ∅) w
′
=⇒∗ (S;M ′, D′, E′)
where w′ = (σ′1, `1), . . . , (σ′k, `k) for some well-typed ground substitutions σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
k.
Proof. By first applying Theorem 1(1) and Lemma 4(2), then Theorem 4, and
finally Theorem 1(2) we obtain the desired result. uunionsq
C Isabelle/HOL Formalization
We have formalized in Isabelle/HOL the typing result on the constraint level,
i.e., Theorem 4. The formalization builds on [19] and is available at:
https://people.compute.dtu.dk/samo/typing-soundness/
We give in this appendix an overview of the Isabelle-formalized stateful typing
result and point out where it differs from the theory presented in this paper.
Note that there is one small difference between the Isabelle-formalized state-
ful constraints and the constraints presented in this paper: In the Isabelle for-
malization we do not consider events. We can instead model events using sets by
defining assert(e) ≡ insert(e, events), event(e) ≡ e ∈˙ events, and ∀x¯. ¬event(e) ≡
∀x¯. e 6 ∈˙ events, for some set events that is only used for asserting and querying
events. Otherwise the formalization closely follows the pen-and-paper proofs,
and so we will not go into detail with the Isabelle-formalized proofs.
C.1 Term Definitions
We use the IsaFoR/CeTA library [34] that defines terms inductively as either a
variable or a composed term. This definition is parameterized over a type of
variables and a type of function symbols. These type variables are here denoted
by V and Σ:
datatype (Σ,V) term = Var V | Fun Σ ((Σ,V) term list)
Hence a term is either of the form Var x where x has type V or Fun f [t1, . . . , tn]
where f has typeΣ and each ti has type (Σ,V) term. Constants are thus modeled
as composed terms with an empty parameter list: Fun c [].
Note that we cannot directly, in the type (Σ,V) term, require that function
symbols are only applied with the correct number of parameters in composed
terms. For instance, Fun f [] for some f of arity greater than zero is a valid
(Σ,V) term term. Instead we define a notion of well-formedness of terms which
we use throughout the formalization:
definition wftrm t ≡ ∀f T. Fun f T v t −→ length T = arity f
where arity is a function that assigns an arity to each function symbol. This
definition is lifted to sets of terms M as follows:
abbreviation wftrms M ≡ ∀t ∈M. wftrm t
C.2 Locale Assumptions
As in [19] the typed model is parameterized over a typing function Γ that must
satisfy certain requirements. In Isabelle we model this with a locale. For the
stateful typing result we need a distinguished binary symbol pair that is used
in the constraint translation, and so we extend the typed model locale of [19]
accordingly:
locale stateful-typed-model = typed-model arity public Ana Γ
for arity :: Σ ⇒ nat
and public :: Σ ⇒ bool
and Ana :: (Σ,V) term⇒ ((Σ,V) term set× (Σ,V) term set)
and Γ :: (Σ,V) term set⇒ (Σ,Ta) term-type
+
fixes pair :: Σ
assumes arity pair = 2
and
∧
f T δ K M. Ana (Fun f T ) = (K,M) =⇒
Ana (δ(Fun f T )) = (δ(K), δ(M))
Another change to [19] is the additional assumption Ana3 from the prelimi-
naries and a corresponding simplification of the analysis interface. While in [19]
the keys K also had to be subterms of the analyzed term, Ana3 is stated only
for terms that do not yield (∅, ∅). The weaker version of Ana3 used in [19] is nec-
essary when modeling public-key encryption with a function pub from private
to public keys, but it also leads to complications when proving a typing result.
Since we can model private keys using a function inv from public to private keys,
and since Ana3 simplifies the typing result, we have decided to assume Ana3 for
the stateful typing result.
C.3 Strand Definitions
datatype (Σ,V) stateful-strand-step =
Send ((Σ,V) term)
| Receive ((Σ,V) term)
| Equality ((Σ,V) term) ((Σ,V) term)
| Inequality (V list) ((Σ,V) term) ((Σ,V) term)
| Insert ((Σ,V) term) ((Σ,V) term)
| Delete ((Σ,V) term) ((Σ,V) term)
| InSet (V list) ((Σ,V) term) ((Σ,V) term)
| NotInSet ((Σ,V) term) ((Σ,V) term)
type-synonym (Σ,V) stateful-strand = (Σ,V) stateful-strand-step list
Fig. 3. Stateful strands as an Isabelle/HOL datatype.
Stateful strands and constraints are defined as lists of steps—see Figure 3.
We also similarly define a datatype strand-step which only has constructors for
non-stateful steps, i.e., Send, Receive, Equality, and Inequality. A strand is
then a list of strand-step. This is the datatype used in the formalization of the
non-stateful typing result [19], with extensions to support (in-)equalities and a
slightly more general analysis theory.
For convenience we just use the send, receive, etc., notation from the paper for
the constructors Send, Receive, etc. of both stateful-strand-step and strand-step.
Note that this will introduce some ambiguity in the following definitions, because
the constructors of both strand datatypes overlap, but it should be obvious from
the context which datatype is meant. This is of course only an ambiguity in this
presentation, not the actual Isabelle-formalization.
Constraint well-formedness and semantics are defined similarly to Defini-
tion 4 respectively Definition 2, but we use a slightly different notation in the
Isabelle-formalization. For well-formedness of constraints A we split the defini-
tion into two (see Figure 5): The function wf′sst V A corresponds to wf V (A), and
wfsst A that corresponds to the full well-formedness criteria, i.e., that wf ∅(A)
and that the free variables fv A and bound variables bvars A are disjoint. The
Isabelle-formalized constraint semantics is listed in Figure 4 and closely follows
Definition 2.
C.4 Constraint Reduction
The translation trD,E is defined as a function tr A D in Isabelle where A is
a constraint and D is a database mapping. Since we model events using set
operations we do not need a parameter E for asserted events in the Isabelle
formalization.
There are some differences between the pen-and-paper version tr and the
Isabelle version tr: We model the database mapping D and the result of the
fun J_;_;_Ks whereJM ;D; []Ks = λI. True
| JM ;D; send(t).AKs = λI. M ` I(t) ∧ JM ;D;AKs I
| JM ;D; receive(t).AKs = λI. Jinsert I(t) M ;D;AKs I
| JM ;D; t .= t′.AKs = λI. I(t) = I(t′) ∧ JM ;D;AKs I
| JM ;D; (∀X. t 6 .= t′).AKs = λI.
(∀δ. domsubst δ = set X ∧ ground (imgsubst δ) −→ I(δ(t)) 6= I(δ(t′)))
∧ JM ;D;AKs I
| JM ;D; insert(t, s).AKs = λI. JM ; insert I((t, s)) D;AKs I
| JM ;D; delete(t, s).AKs = λI. JM ;D \ {I((t, s))};AKs I
| JM ;D; t ∈˙ s.AKs = λI. I((t, s)) ∈ D ∧ JM ;D;AKs I
| JM ;D; (∀X. t 6 ∈˙ s).AKs = λI.
(∀δ. domsubst δ = set X ∧ ground (imgsubst δ) −→ I(δ((t, s))) /∈ D)
∧ JM ;D;AKs I
abbreviation I |=s A ≡ J∅; ∅;AKs I
Fig. 4. The constraint semantics formalized in Isabelle/HOL.
fun wf′sst where
wf′sst V [] = True
| wf′sst V (receive(t).A) = (fv t ⊆ V ∧ wf′sst V A)
| wf′sst V (send(t).A) = wf′sst (V ∪ fv t) A
| wf′sst V (t .= t′.A) = (fv t′ ⊆ V ∧ wf′sst (V ∪ fv t) A)
| wf′sst V ((∀X. t 6 .= t′).A) = wf′sst V A
| wf′sst V (insert(t, s).A) = (fv t ⊆ V ∧ fv s ⊆ V ∧ wf′sst V A)
| wf′sst V (delete(t, s).A) = (fv t ⊆ V ∧ fv s ⊆ V ∧ wf′sst V A)
| wf′sst V (t ∈˙ s.A) = wf′sst (V ∪ fv t ∪ fv s) A
| wf′sst V ((∀X. t 6 ∈˙ s).A) = wf′sst V A
abbreviation wfsst A ≡ wf′sst ∅ A ∧ fv A ∩ bvars A = ∅
Fig. 5. The constraint well-formedness requirements formalized in Isabelle/HOL.
translation as lists instead of sets. This is for technical reasons more convenient:
The list datatype in Isabelle/HOL is inductively defined and so all lists are
finite. This ensures that D is always finite (tr is not defined for infinite D). The
list representation moreover provides an ordering of the elements (namely their
positions in D) and so we can easily iterate over the elements using the usual
map and filter functions. For instance, in the translation of ∀x¯. t 6 ∈˙ s we need
to construct a finite list of inequalities containing one inequality constraint for
each element of D during translation, and we can do so with map.
fun tr where
tr [] D = [[]]
| tr (send(t).A) D = map (λB. send(t).B) (tr A D)
| tr (receive(t).A) D = map (λB. receive(t).B) (tr A D)
| tr (t .= t′.A) D = map (λB. t .= t′.B) (tr A D)
| tr ((∀X. t 6 .= t′).A) D = map (λB. (∀X. t 6 .= t′).B) (tr A D)
| tr (insert(t, s).A) D = tr A (List.insert (t, s) D)
| tr (delete(t, s).A) D = (
concat (map (λDi. map (λB. (map (λd. to-pair (t, s)
.
= to-pair d) Di).
(map (λd. to-pair (t, s) 6 .= to-pair d)
(filter (λd. d /∈ set Di) D)).B)
(tr A (filter (λd. d /∈ set Di) D)))
(subseqs D)))
| tr (t ∈˙ s.A) D =
concat (map (λB. map (λd. to-pair (t, s) .= to-pair d) D) (tr A D))
| tr ((∀X. t 6 ∈˙ s).A) D =
map (λB. (map (λd. (∀X. to-pair (t, s) 6 .= to-pair d)) D).B) (tr A D)
where List.insert d D appends d to the list D if d does not occur in D,
subseqs D constructs all subsequences of D, to-pair (t, t′) is an abbreviation
of the term Fun pair [t, t′], and filter, map, and concat are defined as usual.
The first equation simply constructs the singleton list containing the empty
constraint []: [[]]. This corresponds to the first equation of Definition 9 that
returns a singleton set containing the empty constraint, i.e., {0} in the pen-and-
paper notation.
C.5 Type-Flaw Resistance
The Isabelle function setopssst corresponds to setops(·) while trmssst corre-
sponds to trms(·). Substitution well-typedness is denoted by wtsubst in Isabelle.
We define type-flaw resistance of stateful constraints in three steps. First, we
formalize in Isabelle Definition 9(1) as follows:
definition tfrset M ≡
(∀s ∈ (SMP M) \ V. ∀t ∈ (SMP M) \ V. (∃δ. δ(s) = δ(t)) −→ Γ (s) = Γ (t))
where SMP M denotes the sub-message patterns of the set of terms M .





= t′) = ((∃δ. δ(t) = δ(t′)) −→ Γ (t) = Γ (t′))
| tfrsstp (∀X. t 6 .= t′) = (∀x ∈ (fv t ∪ fv t′) \ set X. ∃a. Γ (Var x) = TAtom a)
| tfrsstp (insert(t, t′)) = (∀x ∈ fv t ∪ fv t′. ∃a. Γ (Var x) = TAtom a)
| tfrsstp (∀X. t 6 ∈˙ t′) = (∀x ∈ (fv t ∪ fv t′) \ set X. ∃a. Γ (Var x) = TAtom a)
| tfrsstp _ = True
Finally, we say that a stateful constraint A is type-flaw resistant if the set of
terms trmssst A∪setopssst A satisfy tfrset and if all steps of A satisfy tfrsstp:
definition tfrsst A ≡ tfrset (trmssst A ∪ setopssst A) ∧ list-all tfrsstp A
where here list-all P L is true if and only if all elements of the list L satisfy
the predicate P .
C.6 Lemmas and Theorems
The Isabelle-formalized proofs closely follows the pen-and-paper proofs and so
we will not explain the proofs in this subsection.
Lemma 1 is formalized in Isabelle as follows. Here iksst A denotes the in-
truder knowledge of A while dbupdsst A I D denotes db(insert(D).I(A)):
lemma strand-sem-append-stateful :JM ;D;A.BKs I ←→ JM ;D;AKs I ∧ JM ∪ I(iksst A); dbupdsst A I D;BKs I
The semantic equivalence theorem—Theorem 2—is as follows. The semantics
for the ordinary constraints is here denoted by |= while the semantics for the
stateful constraints is denoted by |=s:
lemma tr-wf :
assumes A′ ∈ tr A [] and wfsst A and wftrms (trmssst A)
shows wfst ∅ A′ and wftrms (trmsst A′) and fv A′ ∩ bvars A′ = ∅
lemma tr-sem-equiv :
assumes fv A ∩ bvars A = ∅ and interpretationsubst I
shows I |=s A←→ (∃A′ ∈ tr A []. I |= A′)
Lemma 4 concerns type-flaw resistance. On the constraint-level the Isabelle/HOL
statement is as follows:
lemma tr-tfr :
assumes A′ ∈ tr A [] and tfrsst A shows tfrst A
Finally we have the typing result on the constraint level, namely Theorem 4:
theorem stateful-typing-result :
assumes wfsst A and tfrsst A and wftrms (trmssst A)
and interpretationsubst I and I |=s A
obtains Iτ where interpretationsubst Iτ
and Iτ |=s A and wtsubst Iτ and wftrms (imgsubst Iτ )
